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Jurisdictional Statement
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann., Section 78-2-2(3)(j) and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Ann., an Order entered by the Utah Supreme
Court on September 23, 2005, transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals.
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Statement of the Issues
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY OR CONSIDER THE MANDATES
OF § 31A-22-303, U.C.A., IN LIGHT OF STATE FARM'S POLICY EXCLUSIONS ON COVERAGE.

A.
Omnibus coverage is intended to insure all permissive users to the
same extent as the owner.
Issued preserved:

Record at 125 (hereinafter as "Rec. at

"); Transcript of

Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Rec. at 171 (additionally as (Trans,
at

")
Standard of review: The appropriate standard of review for a trial courts

interpretation of statutory law is correction of error. Ong Intern. (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th
Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993). The interpretation of a contract normally presents
a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Village Inn Apartments v. State
Farm Fire and Casualty Co.. 790 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App.1990); Home Sav. and Loan v.
Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.. 817 P.2d 341 (Utah App. 1991).
B.
Assuming the clear and unambiguous language of the policy and
undisputed facts of the case, State Farm's policy provides $50,000 per insured.
Issued preserved:

Rec. at 124

Standard of review: The interpretation of a contract normally presents a question
of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire and
Casualty Co.. 790 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App.1990); Home Sav. and Loan v. Aetna Cas.
and Sur. Co.. 817 P.2d 341 (Utah App. 1991); U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Sandt. 854
P.2d 519 (Utah 1993); Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook. 980 P.2d 685 (Utah 1999).
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II.
THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE LANGUAGE OF STATE FARM'S
MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY POLICY VIOLATES PUBLIC POLICY.

Issued preserved:

Rec. at 125; 171, Trans, at 33:5-13.

Standard of review: The interpretation of a contract normally presents a question
of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire and
Casualty Co.. 790 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App.1990); Home Sav. and Loan v. Aetna Cas.
and Sur. Co.. 817 P.2d 341 (Utah App. 1991); U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Sandt. 854
P.2d 519 (Utah 1993); Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook. 980 P.2d 685 (Utah 1999).
III.

STATE FARM'S POLICY CONTAINS AN IMPLIED STEP-DOWN PROVISION TO

LIMIT RECOVERY TO BELOW STATUTORY MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS AND IS, THEREFORE,
CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW AND AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.

Issued preserved:

Rec. at 125; 171 ,Trans at 34:12-20.

Standard of review: The interpretation of a contract normally presents a question
of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 857 P.2d 922
(Utah 1993); Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.. 790 P.2d 581,
582 (Utah App.1990); Home Sav. and Loan v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.. 817 P.2d 341
(Utah App. 1991).
IV.

STATE FARM'S

POLICY

CREATES AN AMBIGUITY

THROUGH

ITS

FAILURE TO ADHERE TO LEGISLATIVE MANDATES OF COVERAGE.

Issued preserved:

Rec. at 119; 171, Trans, at 25:2-7.

Standard of review: The interpretation of a contract normally presents a question
of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 857 P.2d 922
(Utah 1993); Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.. 790 P.2d 581,
-2-

582 (Utah App.1990); Home Sav. and Loan v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.. 817 P.2d 341
(Utah App. 1991).
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Determinative Statutes
The following Statutes are determinative on this appeal:
Utah Code Annotated, § 31A-22-303. Motor vehicle liability coverage. (Attached
hereto as Addendum "A")
Utah Code Annotated, § 31A-22-304. Motor vehicle liability policy minimum
limits (Attached hereto as Addendum "B")
Utah Code Annotated, § 31A-21-308. Limitations on loss to be borne by insurer.
(Attached hereto as Addendum "C")
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Statement of the Case
This case presents an issue of first impression in Utah. The essential question
before this Court is whether Utah's compulsory automobile insurance statute, U.C.A.
§31A-22-303, supports a limitation of liability to a single policy limit regardless of the
number of negligent insureds. To that end, a review of critical issues is required.
A.

Nature of the Case

This case arises from an automobile accident occurring on May 11, 2003, wherein
Appellant Ruby Deherrera was a passenger in a motor vehicle driven by Manuel Olmos,
who had permission to operate the vehicle from the owner, Robert Pacheco. Robert
Pacheco was the named insured on a policy issued by Appellee State Farm Insurance,
which covered the subject vehicle. Rae-Ann Martinez was also a passenger in the
vehicle.
The Appellee (State Farm) stipulated for the purpose of its declaratory action that
Manuel Olmos, Robert Pacheco, and Rae-Ann Martinez were insureds under the State
Farm policy. Rec at 171; Trans, at 4:16-5:3.

The Appellee further stipulated for the

purpose of the declaratory action that Manuel Olmos, Robert Pacheco, and Rae-Ann
Martinez were each negligent in causing injury to Ruby Deherrera. IdL Trans, at 15:1920.
Appellant asserted below that she was entitled to damages from each of the three
negligent parties and that the policy issued by State Farm must indemnify and provide
separate coverage for each negligent actor. State Farm's position below was, irrespective
-5-

of whether more than one insured is at fault for causing injury, its limits of liability are
not increased, and the policy unambiguously precluded recovery for any amount over
$50,000.00.
B.

Course of Proceedings

Appellee State Farm Insurance brought a declaratory judgment action to determine
its rights and liabilities under a policy of motor vehicle insurance issued to Robert
Pacheco. State Farm moved for summary judgment asserting that its policy expressly
limited its liability to the $50,000 per person coverage as it would otherwise apply to
multiple insureds.
In response to the declaratory judgment action, Appellant filed her answer, thirdparty complaint, and cross-claim. Appellant resisted the motion for summary judgment
asserting that the State Farm policy unambiguously provided $50,000 of coverage to an
insured for negligence in causing injury to one person, and that each of the three insured
tortfeasors were entitled to such coverage respectively. Appellant asserted that to the
extent that State Farm's policy failed to clearly and unequivocally exclude such coverage,
it was ambiguous. Appellant further contended that the State Farm policy was at odds
with Utah's omnibus provision set forth in Section 31A-22-303, U.C.A. Appellant filed a
cross motion for summary judgment seeking additional liability coverage in the amount
of $100,000.00, being $50,000.00 for each of the other negligent parties.
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C.

Disposition in the trial court

On August 3, 2005, the lower court heard oral argument on Appellee State Farm's
Motion for Summary Judgment. The lower court ruled from the bench in favor of State
Farm Insurance, and against the Appellant. See Record at 171 (Transcript of Proceedings
attached as Addendum "D"); Order Granting Summary Judgment, Addendum "E.M
Relevant Facts
The following facts are undisputed as stipulated to by the parties for purposes of
State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment:
Robert D. Pacheco was the owner of a Pontiac Sunfire involved in the'Mayll,
2003 accident, and was negligent in entrusting the operation of the vehicle to Manuel
Olmos. Manuel Olmos was the permissive driver of the Pacheco vehicle involved in the
May 11, 2003 accident, and was negligent in the operation of said vehicle. Rae-Ann
Martinez was a front seat passenger in the Pacheco vehicle, and was negligent when she
grabbed the steering wheel causing the vehicle to abruptly swerve causing the vehicle to
crash resulting in Appellant's injuries and damages.
Based upon the parties' stipulation below, this Court is to consider as undisputed
that Defendants Pacheco, Olmos, and Martinez are negligent and insured under State
Farm's policy at issue here. Rec. at 171: Trans, at 4:16-5:3: 15:19-20.
State Farm Insurance Company issued a Policy of Insurance titled "Your State
Farm Car Policy" to Robert D. Pacheco. (Pacheco Insurance Policy.)

The Policy

identifies the named insured as Robert D. Pacheco, and extends, subject to its terms,
-7-

conditions, and exclusions, certain coverage to an "insured" as defined in the particular
coverage.
The terms of the Policy provide that State Farm will pay those damages, subject to
the terms, conditions, exclusions, definitions, and limitations, that "an insured" becomes
legally liable to pay because of bodily injury to others and damage to or destruction of
property, including loss of use, caused by an accident resulting from the ownership,
maintenance, or use of "your car" as defined more fully in the Policy. See Pacheco Policy
as Addendum "F" hereto.
The Policy extends liability coverage, subject to the terms, conditions, exclusions,
and limitations, to the use by an insured of a car as defined in the Policy. The Policy
states that "[t]he amount of bodily injury liability coverage is shown on the declarations
page," which in this case provided $50,000 liability coverage per person for bodily injury.
The Policy further provides that "[w]e will pay damages for which an insured is legally
liable up to these amounts." (Pacheco Insurance Policy)
State Farm paid $50,000 toward settling DeHerrera's claims against all three
negligent parties insured by State Farm (Pacheco, Olmos, and Martinez) and reserved for
its declaratory judgment action the additional claims sought by Appellant. Rec. at 70-75
(State Farm Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief).
Summary of Arguments
On this appeal, Appellant is challenging the lower court's grant of summary
judgment to Plaintiff/Appellee State Farm Insurance Company (hereinafter as "State
-8-

Farm"). The lower court ruled that Appellant DeHerrera was not entitled to multiple
liability coverages arising out of a single motor vehicle policy based upon there being
more than one negligent insured.

Appellant assigns as error the lower court's

interpretation of the policy against the backdrop of Utah statutory law governing motor
vehicle liability coverage in Section 3 l-A-22-303, U.C.A.
It is further asserted on this appeal that the lower court's interpretation of the
policy violates public policy with respect to limiting coverage contrary to the mandated
omnibus coverage afforded by law, and that the public will, generally, be prejudiced by
such interpretation in the absence of a clear legislative intent to permit insurers to limit
coverage as in this case. Appellant submits that the import of the limitation of liability
clause in the policy creates an impermissible, implied step-down effect of coverage,
which is prohibited under Utah law, and against public policy.
In the alternative, Appellant asserted that State Farm's policy was inherently
ambiguous through its creation of a limitation not permitted under Utah law and contrary
to public policy by too broadly limiting its liability contrary to mandated coverage.
ARGUMENT
It is urged on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error in ruling, as a
matter of law, that the stated per person policy limit of the State Farm policy is to be
shared between the tortfeasors — essentially accepting State Farm's argument that the
insurance policy limits apply only to the injured person through the covered vehicle,
irrespective of the number of negligent insureds. Rec. at 171: Trans, at 34. Therefore,
-9-

according to the trial court's holding, when multiple negligent actors coalesce to create
one harm with one vehicle, one set of policy limits are divided and shared among the
negligent, insured parties.

However, such a conclusion is inconsistent with Utah's

statutory mandates and State Farm's policy, and the judgment of the lower court should
therefore be reversed.
There are a scant number of decisions from other jurisdictions dealing with these
issues, and the courts are split as will be shown below.1
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY OR CONSIDER THE
MANDATES OF § 31A-22-303, U.C.A., IN LIGHT OF STATE FARM'S
POLICY EXCLUSIONS ON COVERAGE.
A.

Omnibus coverage is intended to insure all permissive users to the same
extent as the owner.

At the heart of this controversy is the Utah omnibus statute found in Utah Code
Ann. § 31A-22-303 (1994). It is undisputed that Utah law requires motor vehicle owners
to maintain owner's or operator's security (Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-301(2) (2002), and

1
Those decisions finding multiple coverage include: Miller v. Amundson. 345 N.W.2d
494 (Wise. 1984); Viking Ins. Co. of Wis, v. Petersen. 784 P.2d 437 (Ore. 1989); Iaquinta
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 510 N.W.2d 715 (Wis. 1993); Haislip v. Southern Heritage Ins. Co.. 492
S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1993). Decisions limiting coverage include: GRE Insurance Group v.
Green. 980 P.2d 963 (Az. 1999); Severude v. American Family Ins. Co.. 639 N.W.2d 772
(Wis. App. 2001); Schulte v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co.. 699 N.W.2d 437 (SD 2005);
Murbachv.NoeL 798 N.E.2d 810 (Ill.App.Ct. 2003); Infinity Ins. Co. v. Dodson. 2000 MT
287, 14 P.3d 487; American Standard Ins. Co. v. May. 972 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. 1998).
Decisions finding limited coverage based on differing facts from prior decisions finding
multiple limits apply include: Folkman v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.. 2002 WI 237, 652
N.W.2d 406; Johnson v. Windsor. 597 S.E.2d 31 (Va. 2004).
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any such insurance policy must include the coverage required by Utah Code Ann. § 31A22-303 (2002). It is assumed in this case that the policy issued by State Farm Insurance
to Defendant Pacheco was purchased to satisfy the security requirement of Section 4112a-301(2), and required by law to contain the coverage requirements of Section 31A-22303, U.C.A.
Section 31A-22-303 of the Utah Code provides:2
(l)(a) In addition to complying with the requirements of Chapter 21,
Insurance Contracts in General, and Chapter 22, Part 2, Liability
Insurance in General, a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage
under Subsection 31 A-22-302(l)(a) shall:
(I)
name the motor vehicle owner or operator in whose
name the policy was purchased, state that named insured's
address, the coverage afforded, the premium charged, the
policy period, and the limits of liability;
(ii)(A) if it is an owner's policy, designate by appropriate
reference all the motor vehicles on which coverage is granted,
insure the person named in the policy, insure any other person
using any named motor vehicle with the express or implied
permission of the named insured, and, except as provided in
Subsection (7), insure any person included in Subsection
(l)(a)(iii) against loss from the liability imposed by law for
damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of
these motor vehicles within the United States and Canada,
subject to limits exclusive of interest and costs, for each
motor vehicle, in amounts not less than the minimum limits
specified under Section 31A-22-304;
Therefore, as a matter of Utah law, the subject policy "covered" the Pacheco
vehicle and insured" Mr. Pacheco. The policy, as required by law, further insured uany
2
Section 31 A-22-303 of the Utah Code was rewritten and became effective after the
subject accident. A copy of the former Section is provided as Addendum "A" hereto.
-11-

other person using any named motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of the
named insured/' It should also be noted that under this Court's ruling in Speros v. Fricke.
2004 UT 69, f35-36, 98 P.3d 28, any person occupying a motor vehicle is a "permissive
user." In this case, additional negligence claims were asserted against Manual Olmos as
the permissive operator of the vehicle, and Rae-Ann Martinez as a passenger. State Farm
stipulated below that issues of liability were not disputed. Rec. at 171; Trans 26:18-20.
The term "omnibus" has been engrafted into Utah law and used to define this
broad effect of coverage to permissive users of automobiles. Rasmussen v. Western Cas.
& Sur. Co.. 393 P.2d 376, 378, 15 Utah 2d 333 (Utah 1964).
Like §31A-22-303 of the Utah Code, most omnibus statutes require that an
insurance policy issued to the owner of the vehicle cover both the owner and all other
permissive users. Therefore, if the policy does not say otherwise, ,f[T]he operation of an
omnibus clause creates liability insurance in favor of persons other than the named
insured to the same degree as the insured." Estate of Trobaugh v. Farmers Ins. Exch..
2001 SD 37,K 21, 623 N.W.2d 497. See also Rasmussen v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co.. 393
P.2d 376, 15 Utah 2d 333,(Utah 1964)(The unqualified word insured1 includes the named
insured and also includes. . .any person while using an owned automobile). Accordingly,
to comply with an omnibus statute an insurance policy issued in Utah must cover both the
owner and all permissive users. Section 31A-22-303, U.C.A., Speros. supra.
The interplay between the omnibus laws and collective acts of negligence on the
same insurance policy remains a novel topic, and has not been addressed in Utah. In
-12-

1984 the Wisconsin Supreme Court appears to be the first Court to review the issue in
Miller v. Amundson. 345 N.W.2d 494 (Wis. 1984). In Miller, the Court upheld the lower
court's award of damages for injuries a young boy received when he fell from the back of
a pickup truck driven by his grandmother and where his mother was a passenger.
The judgment in that case required the insurer to provide $100,000 of automobile
liability insurance coverage to each of the defendants, who were both found causally
negligent, even though the policy provided $100,000 single limit coverage. The Miller
policy was issued to the youth's father, who was not involved with the accident.
Miller is particularly instructive since the Court considered a policy exclusion
similar to that in the instant case:
The insurance afforded under Bodily Injury and Property Damage
Liability Coverages applies separately to each Insured against whom claim
is made or suit is brought, but the inclusion herein of more than one Insured
shall not operate to increase the limits of the Company's liability.
Miller. 345 N.W.2d at 496 [Emphasis added.]
The Miller policy exclusion that "the inclusion herein of more than one Insured
shall not operate to increase the limits of the Company's liability" is identical to State
Farm's policy here in that both solicit to limit the payment of money where more than one
insured is covered for independent negligent conduct. The genuine intent of that policy
exclusion on the part of State Farm here will be discussed below.
In 1989 the Oregon Supreme Court in Viking Ins. Co. of Wis, v. Petersen. 784
P.2d 437 (Ore. 1989) interpreted the Oregon omnibus statute requiring that all auto

-13-

insurance cover both the owner and permissive users. The Oregon Supreme Court held
that the insurer "must provide coverage for [the] permissive user and to [the owner of the
vehicle] for any negligent entrustment liability arising out of the use of the vehicle" Id.
at 440. This language harmonizes with Utah law as this Court has already ruled that our
omnibus statute is intended to ensure a permissive user of a vehicle is insured to the same
degree as the owner, whether a premium is paid or not. Rasmussen v. Western Cas. &
Sur. Co., 393 P.2d 376, 378, 15 Utah 2d 333 (Utah 1964); see also Estate of Trobaugh v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 2001 SD 37, ^[21,623 NW2d 497.
In 1993, courts in Wisconsin and Virginia continued this line of reasoning
discussing circumstances identical to the facts in this case. Both jurisdictions held that
similar omnibus statutes required separate policy limits when separate acts of negligence
combine to create a single harm. See Iaquinta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 510 N.W.2d 715, 71718 (Wis. 1993); Haislip v. Southern Heritage Ins. Co., 492 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1993). Both
decisions were predicated on omnibus statutes similar to Utah's in that the statutes
required that all auto insurance policies insure both the policyholder and all permissive
users. See generally, Id Applying the settled law to the unique facts of each case, both
courts held that a policyholder and permissive user are simultaneously insured under
separate policy limits for their separate acts of negligence, even when the negligence
coalesces to create one harm. Id.3
3
In 2002, the Wisconsin Court in Folkman v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 WI237,
652 N.W.2d 406 found against multiple insured limits contrary to Miller and Iaquinta, but
not overruling those decisions. The Folkman Court distinguished those decisions based upon
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Of particular significance is the ruling in Iaquinta v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 510 N.W.2d
715, 717-18 (Wis. 1993)4, where plaintiff Iaquinta sustained injuries when the insured
automobile, operated by Rasmussen, who was intoxicated, struck Iaquinta's automobile.
The owner of the vehicle, Moore, had allowed Rasmussen to drive her automobile, and
was a passenger at the time of the accident. The parties stipulated that Rasmussen
negligently operated the automobile and that Monroe had negligently entrusted the
automobile to Rasmussen.
Based upon those stipulated facts in that case, the only issue presented to the lower
court was whether the $25,000.00 per person limitation of liability contained in the
Allstate policy restricts recovery when there are two separate and distinct acts of
negligence (negligence in entrusting the vehicle and negligence in its operation).

The

lower court ruled against the plaintiff. Id
On appeal in Iaquinta. as here, the appellant argued that the trial court's application
of the omnibus statute to the facts of the case was erroneous. The Iaquinta court reversed
the lower court's decision and relying on its prior holding in Miller, supra, held that
an active negligence approach to imposing multiple limits. In 2004, the Supreme Court of
Virginia revisited the same issue in Johnson v. Windsor. 597 S.E.2d 31 (Va. 2004), holding
that the legislature had modified the omnibus statute to include specific limitations against
multiple insured recovery.
4
State Farm may suggest that Miller and Iaquinta. and Haislip were legislatively
overruled by Folkman and Johnson, respectively, through revision of the omnibus statutes.
The omnibus clause applicable to Miller and Iaquinta did not modify the pertinent section,
and the Folkman case presented different facts resulting in an opposite ruling. Haislip
remains persuasive based upon the omnibus statute relevant at the time, which was similar
to Utahfs current version.
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"separate coverage must be provided only in cases where both the named insured and the
additional insured are actively negligent" Id. at 666 [emphasis added](citing Landsinger
v. Family Mut. Ins. Co,. 142 Wis.2d 138, 142-43, 417 N.W.2d 899, 900-01
(Ct.App.1987). The Iaquinta court reasoned that where the negligence of the additional
insured is merely imputed to the named insured, or where the named insured is
vicariously liable, the holding of Miller is inapplicable and the policy limits expressed in
the policy are unaffected by the omnibus statute." Id.
In the instant case, the stipulated facts are in harmony with those decisions. These
separate and palpable acts of negligence should each obtain the coverage provided by the
State Farm policy and as plainly expressed in Utah's omnibus clause insuring each of the
negligent, insured individuals, and the statement in State Farm's policy that "[it] will pay
damages an insured becomes legally liable to pay..." Addendum "F".
The rudimentary conclusion should be reached that these three negligent
individuals are each entitled to insurance coverage for their misdeeds as a matter of law
under Section 31A-22-303, and it stands to reason that each should be cloaked with
policy dollars, even when their negligence coalesces. Furthermore, the statutory mandate
of coverage should not be parsed by an illusory game of semantics by State Farm
interpreting its own policy. Accordingly, under State Farm's theory, either Martinez,
Olmos, or Pacheco is insured—but not all. The meaning and intent of the omnibus clause
of mandatory coverage loses impact. Moreover, co-active and independent negligence
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that would otherwise be insured (and is required by law to be insured) is either not
insured or underinsured.5
For this very reason, the appellate court decision of Murbach v. NoeL 343 III. App.
30 644, 798 N.E.2d 810 (III. App. 2003) cited favorably here by State Farm, and accepted
as persuasive by the trial court, is inadequately reasoned and implausible. See GRE Ins.
Group v. Green, 980 P2d 963 (Ariz. App. 1999)(holding the number of insureds does not
matter as the policy limits refer to the number of persons injured); accord American
Standard Ins. Co. of Wis, v. May. 972 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. App. 1998).
The Murbach decision failed to cite or even analyze the Illinois omnibus clause in
its statute, although a vague reference is made to such coverage being mandated by law.
Id. at 810. Murbach is distinguished for that reason alone, and results in a wholesale
affirmation and potentially abusive result against legislative intent absent an appropriate
analysis.
This Court has held that ff[t]he legislature should not be deemed to have created
such a potentially unfair rule without clear and convincing language evidencing its intent
to do so ...•" In re Marriage of Gonzalez. 2000 UT 28, 1 P.3d 1074. Furthermore,
"[w]hen doubt or uncertainty exists as to the meaning or application of an act's
provisions, an analysis of the act in its entirety should be undertaken and its provisions
5
The word "coverage" includes the policy's dollar limits of liability. Smith v. National
Indemnity Co., 57 Wis.2d 706, 712, 205 N.W.2d 365, 368 (1973). Appellant is unable to
find any Utah decision that specifically equates "coverage" with the policy's dollar limits of
liability. It is assumed that this is an unnecessary exercise to parallel "coverage" with policy
dollars.
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harmonized in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose." Clark v. Clark, 27
P.3d 538, 540 (Utah 2001)(citing Craftsman Builderrs Supply v. Butler Mfg., 1999 UT
18,125, 974 P.2d 1194).
When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the Court will not look beyond
the plain language to determine the legislative intent. Miller Welding Supply, Inc. v.
Utah State Tax Com'n, Auditing Div., 860 P.2d 361 (Utah App. 1993), citing Sneddon v.
Graham, 821 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Utah App.1991). "In determining the legislative intent of
a statute, 'the statute should be considered in the light of the purpose it was designed to
serve and so applied as to carry out that purpose if it can be done consistent with its
language.1"

Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah

1991)(footnote omitted).
Under a proper analysis, Utah's omnibus statute is intended to provide uniform
mandatory insurance coverage for motorists. State Farm's policy, like others, appears to
follow statutorily mandated omnibus coverage, but goes beyond the legislative dictate by
limiting its monetary liability without legislative authority. There is nothing in the statute
granting such a sweeping exclusion of coverage, and is, in fact, contrary to the express
language of the statute granting coverage.
This is apparent to other jurisdictions where Omnibus statutes are intended to
augment insurance coverage, not take it away; hence, there must be separate insurance for
each active participant of negligence regardless of the number of injuries produced. See
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Iaquinta. 510 NW2d 715, 717-18 (Wis. 1993); Haislip, 492 SE2d 135 (Va. 1993). To hold
otherwise would clearly undermine the intended purpose of our omnibus statute.
Indeed, the Utah Legislature could not have intended such sophistry when the very
purpose of the omnibus statute is to protect persons such as Appellant DeHerrera from the
horrors of injury at the hands of multiple defendants. Nor could the legislature have
desired persons such as defendant Pacheco to have personal exposure for his individual
negligence when he specifically contracted with State Farm to avoid such a result. For
precisely this reason, Defendant State Farm's position is unconvincing. The policyholder
should be assumed to have complied with the law by purchasing insurance and should not
be left with less than the coverage paid for, or possibly none. Furthermore, the general
traveling public should be protected from uncompensated injury, as the legislature so
intended, simply because more than one tortfeasor happens to be in the same vehicle with
the victim.
Despite the clear intent of the Legislature, State Farm argued, and the trial court
accepted as true, that statutory liability is limited to one set of policy limits per vehicle
even when two or more defendants insured under the same policy are negligent. There is
simply no basis in Utah law to reconcile such a result. That any legislature would impose
insurance coverage for all persons using, or operating a motor vehicle, yet assumably take
it away with the same stroke of the pen, is an unacceptable conclusion.

Practical

application of the lower court's decision therefore yields a poor result as three
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independently negligent insureds, who happen to be insured under the same policy, are
not insured as intended by legislation, or insured for less than mandated by law.
Finally, what is also evident from the plain language of Section 31A-22-303 of the
Utah Code is that the Legislature's use of the word "and" when describing those persons
who are insured, and is dispositive. That Section provides in part:
(ii)(A) if it is an owner's policy, designate by appropriate reference
all the motor vehicles on which coverage is granted, insure the person
named in the policy, insure any other person using any named motor
vehicle with the express or implied permission of the named insured, and.
except as provided in Subsection (7), insure any person included in
Subsection (lX a )(m)... (Emphasis added)
Proper construction of Section 31A-22-303 requires the conclusion that the State
Farm policy must indemnify both the named insured, permissive users, and relatives of
the named insured in the same household.

The legislature's separation of these

subsections by the conjunctive "and," clearly mandates that a policy must provide
coverage to each insured defined by the policy.

In Haislip. supra, the opinion paid

special attention to the use of the word "and" in the pertinent portion of the omnibus
clause. The majority of that Court ruled that the word "and" is unambiguous with a
dictionary meaning of "along with or together with ... added to or linked to." Haislip v.
Southern Heritage Ins. Co.. 492 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1993) (citing Webster's Third New
World Dictionary, p. 80 (1986)).
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In this setting, Olmos, Martinez, and Pacheco are each insured and entitled to
separate coverage under the policy for their separate negligence, and the trial court erred
by concluding otherwise.
B.
Assuming the clear and unambiguous language of the policy and
undisputed facts of the case, State Farm's policy provides $50,000 per insured.
This case presents a remarkable, and rare situation wherein multiple tortfeasors
combine to cause significant injury and damage to one person. Certainly in this setting,
Appellant is in a small, but distinguished class of claimants. From the perspective of the
public, it is an artificial class created by the insurer and not endorsed by the legislature.
In that regard, while the legislative intent of mandatory insurance coverage for
Utah motorists is well-deserved, the legislature has not specifically adopted the rational
suggested by State Farm here. In other words, Utah's statutory scheme is devoid of any
express provision permitting insurers to limit its liability where more than one negligent
insured under a policy causes injury in a single accident. This issue has been squarely
addressed by other States adopting a more defined omnibus exclusion. See, e.g. Johnson
v. Windsor. 597 S.E.2d 31 (Va. 2004).
In Johnson it was noted that the General Assembly of Virginia specifically
amended Section 38.2-2204 of the Code of Virginia in 1999 to include the following
phrase:
"... nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to prohibit an
insurer from limiting its liability under any one policy for bodily injury or
property damage resulting from any one accident or occurrence to the
liability limits for such coverage set forth in the policy for any such
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accident or occurrence, regardless of the number of insured under the
policy." Section 38.2-2204, as amended 1999.
Johnson, id. at 34 [emphasis added].
The amendment to Virginia's omnibus statute apparently arose from the Virginia
Supreme Court's decision in Haislip v. Southern Heritage Ins. Co.. 254 Va. 265, 492
S.E.2d 135 (1997). Even with the added legislative feature of permitting insurers to limit
their liability for multiple insureds, the Johnson Court, in the wake of the 1999
amendment, ruled that an insurer, in such settings, is still required to pay the per accident
limits, and not the per person limit:
"We are of the opinion that the plain language of the 1999
amendment to the Omnibus Clause clearly enables an insurer to limit its
liability even if more than one insured is liable for the accident or
occurrence. However, such limit is that stated as the "per accident or
occurrence" limit, rather than the "per person" limit."
Johnson. 597 S.E.2d at 34.
What is apparent in Johnson, as should be here, is that the Legislature has never
intended to leave an at-fault insured without some form of coverage. Having never dealt
with this issue, Utah's Legislature has not addressed the issue posed herein, but what
remains clear is that the Legislature has manifested its intent to mandate coverage for all
persons operating or using a motor vehicle. Section 31A-22-303, U.C.A., Section 31A22-302, U.C.A.
For that reason alone, State Farm's policy goes well beyond the Legislative intent
and surpasses the strict dictates of our Omnibus Clause. The practical ramifications of
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the trial court's ruling, and State Farm's strained approach, is that an insurer can
effectively preclude coverage for injured persons who happen to be among other conegligent parties despite the Legislature's mandate.

Additionally, the foreseeable

consequences of an individual like DeHerrera being in the unfortuitous position she was
in is left without adequate remedy that was afforded to her by the Legislature, State
Farm, being a national insurer, apparently has broadly modified its policies to avoid such
a situation in jurisdictions, like Utah, that has yet to face the dilemma. It is not the intent
of the State Farm policy that is at issue, but its over-reaching effect that is contrary to
Utah law.
The undisputed facts of this case show that the limit for each insured under
Pacheco's policy is $50,000 liability coverage per person suffering bodily injury, and that
this limit applies to each of the three insureds who are liable for DeHerrera's injuries.
The insurance contract insured Pacheco against claims for bodily injury and
property damage subject to certain limitations, conditions, and exclusions under Section
I-Liability-Coverage A, and sets forth who is an insured and what limits of liability are
payable under the Policy:
Who Is an Insured
When we refer to your car, a newly acquired car, a temporary substitute car,
or a non-owned car, insured means:
1.
2.
3.

you;
your spouse;
the relatives of the first person named in the declarations;
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4.
5.

any other person while using such a car if its use is within the
scope of consent of you or your spouse; and
any other person or organization liable for the use of such a
car by one of the above insureds.

(Pacheco Insurance Policy) (emphasis omitted.) The Policy also provides a limitation on
liability as follows:
Limits of Liability
The amount of bodily injury liability coverage is shown on the
declarations page under "Limits of Liability - Coverage a - Bodily Injury.
Each Person. Each Accident". Under "Each Person" is the amount of
coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to one person. "Bodily Injury
to one person" includes all injury and damages to others resulting from this
bodily injury\ and all emotional distress resulting from this bodily injury
sustained by other persons who do not sustain bodily injury. Under "Each
Accident" is the total amount of coverage, subject to the amount shown
under "Each, Person", for all damages due to bodily injury to two or more
persons in the same accident.
The amount of property damage liability coverage is shown on the
declarations page under "Limits of Liability - Coverage A - Property
Damage, Each Accident."
We will pay damages for which an insured is legally liable up to
these amounts.
The limits of liability are not increased because more than one
person or organization may be an insured.
(Pacheco Insurance Policy, Addendum "F" hereto.) (emphasis original.)
What is evident from the policy language is that the terms "these amounts," "[t]he
limits of liability," and "the limits" all refer to the amount of liability coverage that an
insured is entitled to receive. Based on the above policy language, the aggregate limits of
the policy and the applicable limit for each identified circumstance are clear. State Farm
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"will pay damages for which an insured is legally liable" up to the amount of $50,000 per
"bodily injury to one person." (Pacheco Insurance Policy, Addendum "F")
State Farm's inclusion of "[t]he limits of liability are not increased because more
than one person or organization may be an insured" fails since it is a limitation not
spawned by Utah law, but its own self-serving interests derived from other jurisdictional
losses. Therefore, State Farm must provide each of the three insureds coverage against
DeHerrera's claims. To read the phrase "more than one person. . . may be an insured" as
invoking the $50,000 limit per injured person would make the coverage ambiguous,
requiring interpretation against the drafter. Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.. 850 P.2d
1272,1275 (Utah 1993).
Furthermore, Appellant's claims do not "increase" the "limits of liability." The
"limits of liability" are the same with respect to each insured under the policy.
Appellant's claims are only against the negligent individuals insured under the policy, and
not against any "insured" who may be listed or insured on the policy, but has no liability
to Appellant. In that respect, State Farm's policy is unclear and incomplete in seeking to
unequivocally state its intention regarding any limitation.
The trial court erred by determining that the subject policy limited Appellant's
recovery to a single per person amount of $50,000.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE LANGUAGE OF STATE FARM'S
MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY POLICY VIOLATES PUBLIC POLICY.

The apparent legislative intent behind our omnibus statute is publically frustrated
when an insurer provides coverage, and then condition that coverage by asserting
exclusion of multiple insureds causing harm.
The case of Error v. Western Home Insurance Co.. 762 P.2d 1077 (Utah 1988)
draws a close analogy to the instant case. In Error, the insurer denied coverage to a coinsured spouse under policy exclusions for "neglect" and "fraud" based upon her
husband's intentional act of burning down the couple's home. The trial judge ruled for
the wife, holding the exclusions inapplicable. This Court affirmed, stating:
[T]he rule of law in a majority of jurisdictions is that an innocent insured is
not necessarily precluded as a matter of law from recovering on a fire
insurance policy because a coinsured intentionally destroyed the insured
premises. The rationales behind this rule vary, but fall into three broad—and
sometimes overlapping—categories. Some jurisdictions focus upon the
insured's property interest. Others focus upon the insured's obligations
under the insurance policy. The rationale that most appeals to our sense of
reason and fairness, and the rationale we adopt today, is that which focuses
upon the responsibility for the fraudulent act.
Error. 762 P.2d at 1080 (footnotes omitted)(emphasis added).
Although Error is based on different facts and insurance policy exclusions, it
nevertheless created a well-deserved rationale for the Court when considering
exclusionary clauses in light of public policy. That "rationale" is simply premised upon a
"sense of reason and fairness."
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In Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call. 712 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1985) it was held that "an
insurer may include in a policy any number or kind of exceptions and limitations to which
an insured will agree unless contrary to statute or public policy."

Thus, an "insurer

rightfully contracts with an insured regarding the particular risks it will undertake or, to
the contrary, the risks it will not assume, as long as the contract does not violate either
statutory law or public policy." Taylor v. American Fire and Cas. Co., 925 P.2d 1279,
1282 (Utah App. 1996).
Section 31A-21-308 of the Utah Code concerns "[limitations on loss to be borne
by insurer," and provides in part:
(1) An insurance policy indemnifying an insured against loss may
by clear language limit the part of the loss to be paid by the insurer to a
specified or determinable maximum amount,...
What is evident from Section 31A-21-308 is that any language purporting to limit
coverage, in any sense, must be "clearly" set forth. Exclusions contained in insurance
policies must be phrased in "language which clearly and unmistakably communicates to
the insured the specific circumstances under which the expected coverage will not be
provided." Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Utah 1993).
State Farm's policy in this regard is lacking clarity with respect to the end result it
sought, and found in the lower court. The policy clearly limits its liability with respect to
"indemnifying an insured against loss...to a specified or determinable maximum amount."
See Section 31A-22-308, U.C.A. It is urged by the insurer that it is permitted to preclude
multiple coverage for its insureds based upon the policy language that "[t]he limits of
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liability are not increased because more than one person...may be an insured." What is
unclear with the exclusion is whether it is applied as done so by the trial court, whether it
applies to the aggregate coverage on a per accident basis, or each insured is entitled to the
separate limits of liability. The limitation on liability clause can further be read as a form
of stacking the limits for more than one insured, but that is also unclear. This is not a
stacking issue, but independent coverage for separate negligence. The specific limitation
language may also be interpreted as applying to all insured, not just negligent insureds.
This approach is more plausible

in light of the Policy's requirement that

indemnification is only available (and necessary) when an injured person asserts a claim
for which he/she is legally entitled to assert. The phrase "legally entitled" is interpreted
by this Court to mean a claim "that is able to be reduced to judgment in a court of law."
Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 927 P.2d 192, 195 (Utah Ct.App.1996).
Therefore, it is axiomatic that the "limits of liability are not increased because more than
one person may be an insured," since not all insureds under a policy are exposed to a
claim that can be reduced to a judgment.
State Farm prevailed below by convincing the court that its limits of liability are
not increased because more than one person may be an "insured," to mean the same as the
limits of liability are not increased because more than one claim is brought against more
than one person who may be an insured. As previously stated, an "insured" under the
policy does not always equate to a negligent individual. State Farm's policy makes no
clear distinction.
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In Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985), this Court endorsed a
public polciy analysis from the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Bishop v. Allstate
Insurance Co., 623 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1981), which stated:
An exclusionary clause in an insurance contract which reduces
below minimum or eliminates either of these coverages [basic reparations
benefits and minimum liability coverage] effectively renders a driver
uninsured to the extent of the reduction or elimination. Because the stated
purpose of the MVRA is to assure that a driver be insured to a minimum
level, such an exclusion contravenes the purpose and policy of the
compulsory insurance act.
Call at 234-35 (quoting Bishop at 865-66 (citations omitted)).
The Call Court further followed the Washington Supreme Court that reached a
similar result based upon a public policy analysis when it stated:
This clause prevents a specific class of innocent victims, those persons
related to and living with the negligent driver, from receiving financial
protection under an insurance policy containing such a clause. In essence,
this clause excludes from protection an entire class of innocent victims for
no good reason.
The exclusion becomes particularly disturbing when viewed in light
of the fact that this class of victims is the one most frequently exposed to
the potential negligence of the named insured. Typical family relations
require family members to ride together on the way to work, church, school,
social functions, or family outings. Consequently, there is no practical
method by which the class of persons excluded from protection by this
provision may conform their activities so as to avoid exposure to the risk of
riding with someone who, as to them, is uninsured.
Call at 235 (quoting Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. Wiscomb. 97 Wash.2d 203,
208, 643 P.2d 441, 444 (1982)).
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What is evident from our jurisprudence and followed from other jurisdictions, is
the public protection afforded through compulsory insurance laws to avoid the
consequences where there is "no practical method by which the class of persons excluded
from protection...may conform their activities so as to avoid exposure to the risk of riding
with someone who, as to them, is uninsured." Wiscomb. supra at 444 [Italics added].
The lower court erred in failing to find that State Farm's policy does not offend
public policy.
POINT III.
STATE FARM'S POLICY CONTAINS AN UNLAWFUL, IMPLIED STEP-DOWN
PROVISION TO LIMIT RECOVERY TO BELOW STATUTORY
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS AND IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.

Section 31A-22-303(l)(a)(ii)(A) of the Utah Code provides that an owner's policy
must insure not only the person named in the policy, but also any other person using the
named automobile with the express or implied permission of the named insured, as well
as relatives of the named insured who are residents of the household.

Subsection

(l)(a)(iii) then provides that the policy must "insure persons related to the named insured
... to the same extent as the named insured." IcL § 31A-22-303(l)(a)(iii). The legislature
has therefore provided for two categories of insureds to be covered in addition to the
named insured: i.e. relatives and permissive users. There is a marked difference between
relatives and permissive users in that the statute mandates that relatives must be covered
to the same extent as the named insured. This suggests that equal coverage is not
required for the other group, permissive users.
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The providing of a lesser amount of coverage is commonly referred to as a "stepdown" provision in a policy and operates to reduce liability coverage to permissive users.
Under Utah law, an insurer is not prohibited from providing step-down coverage for
permissive users, as long as the coverage satisfies the statutory minimums set forth in
Section 31A-22-304, U.C.A.; Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exchange. 857 P.2d 922 (Utah
1993).
In the context of the instant case, State Farm's policy includes a discernible stepdown provision in its policy by way of its claimed "limitation on liability" exposure to
more than one insured arising out of a single accident. In its simplistic operation, Mr.
Pacheco's policy contained a $50,000 per person limit of liability coverage, per insured.
It is stipulated here that there are, at least, three negligent insured persons,
including Mr. Pacheco. State Farm has settled its asserted obligation under the policy and
obtained a release as to all three insureds. The policy's multiple insured limitation fails as
a matter of law since, under any mathematical analysis, the permissive users are insured
for less than the minimum statutory requirements of $25,000 per person, and Mr. Pacheco
has not received the Ml benefit of his policy coverage.
Had State Farm only settled Mr. Pacheco's claim for the limits of liability, the two
remaining insureds under the policy would be without coverage and exposed to personal

6
It is assumed that State Farm covered each of the three negligent parties for $50,000,
since it did not argue below that either of the permissive users were insured for less, or at
least minimum statutory requirements.
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liability. The same would be true in any other combination. The intent of "coverage"
becomes illusory.
It is well settled in Utah that mere incorporation of statutory provisions not
appearing in the contract or in attached documents is prohibited. Section 31A-21-106(1)
provides:
No insurance policy may contain any agreement or incorporate any
provision not fully set forth in the policy or in an application or other
document attached to and made a part of the policy at the time of its
delivery.
The subject policy simply states that "[t]he limits of liability are not increased
because more than one person...may be an insured." The net effect of this limitation is
actually a decrease in coverage below the statutory minimum requirements and is
ineffective as a bar to full recovery for each insured.
Thus, the policy incorporates coverage limits independent of statutory mandated
coverage without fully setting forth the exclusion, subject to minimum compulsory
coverage, in the contract. This violates the plain language and purpose of Section 31A21-106. Cullum at 925. The purpose of Section 31A-21-106 is "to ensure that the entire
insurance contract is contained in one document so that the insured can determine from
the policy exactly what coverage he or she has." Id.
State Farm's policy only considers the limitation of its own liability and not that of
the insureds, since the limitation is not clearly set out as ultimately affecting individual
coverage and compliance with Utah law. Under these circumstances, an insured cannot
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determine what coverage applies, if it applies at all. This defeats the very essence of
insurance coverage. Public policy requires that persons purchasing insurance policies are
entitled to be informed, in writing, of the essential terms of insurance contracts, especially
exclusionary terms. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Martinez. 668 P.2d 498 (Utah
1983).
The clear law in Utah is that "where the insurer fails to disclose material
exclusions in an automobile insurance policy and the purchaser is not informed of them in
writing, those exclusions are invalid. Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call 712 P.2d 236, 237
(Utah 1985). The policy, from the standpoint of construction, is to be perceived by the
Court as it would be understood by the average, reasonable purchaser of insurance.
Draughon v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc. 771 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah App. 1989).
Furthermore, the Utah legislature has provided some guidance with respect to
limitations imposed by insurers:
§ 31A-22-204. Restriction on limitation of coverage
No insurer may limit coverage under a policy insuring against legal
liability to claims that are first made against the insured while the policy is
in force, unless the policy contains on the cover page, a conspicuous
statement that the coverage of the policy is limited in that way.
Taken in context here, State Farm, by operation of its policy, paid out its limit of
liability to all three insureds equally, and simultaneously.

The limitation of liability

provision in the policy is further frustrated by Utah law where claims are made against
insureds other than the primary insured under the policy. By operation of the liability
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restriction, coverage will always be limited first to the insured when multiple claims are
asserted and acted upon in the manner State Farm has elected here.
A reasonable construction of the policy's limitation of liability for more than one
insured deprives one or more of the insureds of the protection that the policy initially
indicates it "will pay," or in an amount that is less than is mandated by Utah law. As
there was no proper exclusion or endorsement in this policy attempting to limit coverage
under these circumstances, State Farm simply cannot lawfully confine the liability limits
in the manner it attempts to. To apply the limitation State Farm suggests, either all of the
negligent actors are underinsured by less than the statutory mandatory minimum
requirements of insurance, or two of them simply have no liability insurance. For this
additional reason, both the permissive users and entrusting owner are each entitled to the
policy limits. Anything less is contrary to Utah law and public policy.
POINT IV.
STATE FARM'S POLICY CREATES AN AMBIGUITY THROUGH ITS FAILURE TO ADHERE TO
LEGISLATIVE MANDATES OF COVERAGE.

Appellant DeHerrera submits that where an insurance policy goes beyond the
essential elements of the omnibus clause with the inclusion of a liability limiting
provision, such a broad inclusion should amount to an ambiguity which must be
construed under operative decisions of this court favorably to the insured.7
7
"Whether the terms of a contract are ambiguous is a question of law...." Oliphant v.
Estate of BrunettL 64 P. 3d 587 (Utah App. 2002) citing Wade v. StangL 869 P. 2d 9, 12
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). "Contract language may be ambiguous if it is unclear, omits terms, or
if the terms used to express the intention of the parties may be understood to have two or
-34-

It is well settled that an ambiguity in an insurance contract is created by the
presence of terms or phrases that are fairly susceptible to different interpretations. An
ambiguity in an insurance contract may arise (1) because of inconsistent or ambiguous
language in a particular provision or (2) because of two or more contract provisions,
when read together, give rise to different or inconsistent meanings, even though each
provision is clear when read alone. Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Versaw, 99 P. 3d 796
(Utah 2004); USF&G v. Sandt 854 P. 2d 519 (Utah 1993). With respect to ambiguity, the
insurance policy must be construed in light of how the average, reasonable purchaser of
insurance would understand the language of the policy as a whole and the policy should
be construed in favor of coverage. Versaw, supra; Sandt supra.
In general, purchasers of insurance ought not to be denied coverage for which they
have paid premiums. See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48
f42, 89 P.3d 97, citing U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519, 525 (Utah 1993)
(holding that an interpretation of an insurance policy under which the insurer would
"never have to pay the full amount of the purchased coverage" would be
"unconscionable").
An insurer should not be permitted to avoid its statutorily imposed liability by its
insertion into the policy of a liability limiting clause which restricts the insured from
receiving that coverage for which the premium has been paid. See Phen v. Progressive

more plausible meanings." Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.. 790 P. 2d
581, 583 (Utah Ct App. 1990) (citation omitted).
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Northern Ins. Co.. 2003 SD 133, If 10, 672 NW2d 52 at 54 (citing Westphal v. Amco Ins.
Co.. 87 SD 404, 209 NW2d 555 (1973)). There is no way to reconcile this statement with
the conclusion reached by the trial court and advocated by State Farm.
By comparison, State Farm's policy at issue in this case insures each of the
negligent individuals. There has never been a dispute on this point. Furthermore, it is
axiomatic that Mr. Pacheco paid insurance premiums for securing liability protection, and
certainly paid premiums with the expectation that each driver and user as defined in the
policy would be protected with the contractually agreed amount of liability coverage.
Utah law requires that the owner and permissive users of a vehicle be covered to
the same degree, and an insurer cannot place in their policy a liability limiting clause
which restricts the insured from receiving that coverage for which the premium has been
paid. See Section 31A-22-204, U.C.A., see also Phen. 2003 SD 133,1 10, 672 NW2d at
54. As a matter of law and sound public policy, the lower court's interpretation of State
Farm's limitation clause produces an unconscionable result since, in this case, State Farm
would never have to pay the full amount of the purchased coverage per insured.
For this additional reason, State Farm's argument and the trial court's ruling to the
effect that a policy can permissibly cap liability limits under these circumstance, is
unpersuasive and unconscionable.
CONCLUSION
Utah law mandates that a permissive user of a vehicle be insured to the same
extent as the owner, or, at least for the minimum amount imposed by law. Here, the
-36-

owner, the operator, and the permissive user were separately negligent and insured. In
order to accurately carry out the will of the Legislature, all must be separately insured
with policy dollars. This conclusion is the only result consistent with Utah law and the
trial court's decision should therefore be reversed.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant Ruby DeHerrera hereby respectively requests the opportunity to appear
before the Court and present oral argument on this appeal in conjunction with the
arguments raised herein. The issues raised on this appeal are matters of first impression
in Utah and argument should be permitted.
Dated this & / day of

t JOV P \v\Lf,

, 200f£ _

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES

GeorgeJ. Waddoups y
Attorneys for Ruby Dqljerrera
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Certificate of Service
This is to certify that on this ^ 3 day of November, 2005, two (2) true and correct
copy of Appellant's Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Stuart H. Schultz
STRONG & HANNI
3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84180
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ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM "A

UT ST Sec. 31A-22-303, Motor vehicle liability coverage

Laws 2004, c. 90, and Laws 2004, c. 126, collectively rewrote this section that
formerly provided:
M

(l)(a) In addition to complying with the requirements of Chapter 21 and Part II of
Chapter 22, a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under Subsection 31 A-22-302(l)(a)
shall:
ff

(i) name the motor vehicle owner or operator in whose name the policy was
purchased, state that named insured's address, the coverage afforded, the premium charged,
the policy period, and the limits of liability;
"(ii)(A) if it is an owner's policy, designate by appropriate reference all the motor
vehicles on which coverage is granted, insure the person named in the policy, insure any
other person using any named motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of the
named insured, and, except as provided in Subsection (7), insure any person included in
Subsection (l)(a)(iii) against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out
of the ownership, maintenance, or use of these motor vehicles within the United States and
Canada, subject to limits exclusive of interest and costs, for each motor vehicle, in amounts
not less than the minimum limits specified under Section 31A-22-304; or
"(B) if it is an operator's policy, insure the person named as insured against loss from
the liability imposed upon him by law for damages arising out of the insured's use of any
motor vehicle not owned by him, within the same territorial limits and with the same limits
of liability as in an owner's policy under Subsection (l)(ii)(A);
"(iii) except as provided in Subsection (7), insure persons related to the named insured
by blood, marriage, adoption, or guardianship who are residents of the named insured's
household, including those who usually make their home in the same household but
temporarily live elsewhere, to the same extent as the named insured and the available
coverage of the policy may not be reduced to the persons described in this Subsection
(l)(a)(iii) because:
"(A) a permissive user driving a covered motor vehicle is at fault in causing an
accident; or
"(B) the named insured or any of the persons described in this Subsection (l)(a)(iii)
driving a covered motor vehicle is at fault in causing an accident; and
"(iv) cover damages or injury resulting from a covered driver of a motor vehicle who

is stricken by an unforeseeable paralysis, seizure, or other unconscious condition and who
is not reasonably aware that paralysis, seizure, or other unconscious condition is about to
occur to the extent that a person of ordinary prudence would not attempt to continue driving.
"(b) The driver's liability under Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is limited to the insurance
coverage.
"(2)(a) A policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage under Subsection
31A-22-302(l)(a)may:
"(i) provide for the prorating of the insurance under that policy with other valid and
collectible insurance;
"(ii) grant any lawful coverage in addition to the required motor vehicle liability
coverage;
"(iii) if the policy is issued to a person other than a motor vehicle business, limit the
coverage afforded to a motor vehicle business or its officers, agents, or employees to the
minimum limits under Section 31A-22-304, and to those instances when there is no other
valid and collectible insurance with at least those limits, whether the other insurance is
primary, excess, or contingent; and
"(iv) if issued to a motor vehicle business, restrict coverage afforded to anyone other
than the motor vehicle business or its officers, agents, or employees to the minimum limits
under Section 31A-22-304, and to those instances when there is no other valid and collectible
insurance with at least those limits, whether the other insurance is primary, excess, or
contingent.

"(b)(i) The liability insurance coverage of a permissive user of a motor vehicle owned
by a motor vehicle business shall be primary coverage.
"(ii) The liability insurance coverage of a motor vehicle business shall be secondary
to the liability insurance coverage of a permissive user as specified under Subsection
(2)(b)(i).
"(3) Motor vehicle liability coverage need not insure any liability:
"(a) under any workers' compensation law under Title 34A, Utah Labor Code;
"(b) resulting from bodily injury to or death of an employee of the named insured,
other than a domestic employee, while engaged in the employment of the insured, or while

engaged in the operation, maintenance, or repair of a designated vehicle; or
"(c) resulting from damage to property owned by, rented to, bailed to, or transported
by the insured.
"(4) An insurance carrier providing motor vehicle liability coverage has the right to
settle any claim covered by the policy, and if the settlement is made in good faith, the amount
of the settlement is deductible from the limits of liability specified under Section
31A-22-304.
"(5) A policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage imposes on the insurer the
duty to defend, in good faith, any person insured under the policy against any claim or suit
seeking damages which would be payable under the policy.
"(6)(a) If a policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage provides an insurer with
the defense of lack of cooperation on the part of the insured, that defense is not effective
against a third person making a claim against the insurer, unless there was collusion between
the third person and the insured.
"(b) If the defense of lack of cooperation is not effective against the claimant, after
payment, the insurer is subrogated to the injured person's claim against the insured to the
extent of the payment and is entitled to reimbursement by the insured after the injured third
person has been made whole with respect to the claim against the insured.
"(7) A policy ofmotor vehicle liability coverage under Subsection 31 A-22-302( 1) may
specifically exclude from coverage a person who is a resident of the named insured's
household, including a person who usually makes his home in the same household but
temporarily lives elsewhere, if:
"(a) at the time of the proposed exclusion, each person excluded from coverage
satisfies the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301, independently
of the named insured's proof of owner's or operator's security;
"(b) the named insured and the person excluded from coverage each provide written
consent to the exclusion; and
"(c) the insurer includes the name of each person excluded from coverage in the
evidence of insurance provided to an additional insured or loss payee.
"(8) A policy of motor vehicle liability coverage may limit coverage to the policy
minimum limits under Section 31A-22-304 if the insured motor vehicle is operated by a
person who has consumed any alcohol or any illegal drug or illegal substance if the policy

or a specifically reduced premium was extended to the insured upon express written
declaration executed by the insured that the insured motor vehicle would not be so operated.
M

(9)(a) When a claim is brought exclusively by a named insured or a person described
in Subsection (l)(a)(iii) and asserted exclusively against a named insured or an individual
described in Subsection (l)(a)(iii), the claimant may elect to resolve the claim:
"(i) by submitting the claim to binding arbitration; or
"(ii) through litigation.
"(b) Once the claimant has elected to commence litigation under Subsection (9)(a)(ii),
the claimant may not elect to resolve the claim through binding arbitration under this section
without the written consent of both parties and the defendants liability insurer.
,f

(c)(i) Unless otherwise agreed on in writing by the parties, a claim that is submitted
to binding arbitration under Subsection (9)(a)(i) shall be resolved by a panel of three
arbitrators.
"(ii) Unless otherwise agreed on in writing by the parties, each party shall select an
arbitrator. The arbitrators selected by the parties shall select a third arbitrator.
"(d) Unless otherwise agreed on in writing by the parties, each party will pay the fees
and costs of the arbitrator that party selects. Both parties shall share equally the fees and
costs of the third arbitrator.
"(e) Except as otherwise provided in this section, an arbitration procedure conducted
under this section shall be governed by Title 78 Chapter 31a, Utah Arbitration Act, unless
otherwise agreed on in writing by the parties.
"(f)(i) Discovery shall be conducted in accordance with Rules 26b through 36, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
"(ii) All issues of discovery shall be resolved by the arbitration panel.

"(g) A written decision of two of the three arbitrators shall constitute a final decision
of the arbitration panel.
"(h) Prior to the rendering of the arbitration award:
"(i) the existence of a liability insurance policy may be disclosed to the arbitration

panel; and
"(ii) the amount of all applicable liability insurance policy limits may not be disclosed
to the arbitration panel.
"(i) The amount of the arbitration award may not exceed the liability limits of all the
defendant's applicable liability insurance policies, including applicable liability umbrella
policies. If the initial arbitration award exceeds the liability limits of all applicable liability
insurance policies, the arbitration award shall be reduced to an amount equal to the liability
limits of all applicable liability insurance policies.
"(j) The arbitration award is the final resolution of all claims between the parties
unless the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means.
"(k) If the arbitration panel finds that the action was not brought, pursued, or defended
in good faith, the arbitration panel may award reasonable fees and costs against the party that
failed to bring, pursue, or defend the claim in good faith.
"(1) Nothing in this section is intended to limit any claim under any other portion of
an applicable insurance policy."

ADDENDUM "B

U.C.A. 1953§31A-22-304
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 31 A. INSURANCE CODE
CHAPTER 22. CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES
PART 3. MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE
Current through End of 2004 4th Sp. Sess.

§ 31A-22-304. Motor vehicle liability policy minimum limits
Policies containing motor vehicle liability coverage may not limit the insurer's
liability under that coverage below the following:
(l)(a) $25,000 because of liability for bodily injury to or death of one person,
arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any one accident;
(b) subject to the limit for one person in Subsection (a), in the amount of $50,000
because of liability for bodily injury to or death of two or more persons arising out of the
use of a motor vehicle in any one accident; and
(c) in the amount of $15,000 because of liability for injury to, or destruction of,
property of others arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any one accident; or
(2) $65,000 in any one accident whether arising from bodily injury to or the death
of others, or from destruction of, or damage to, the property of others.

Laws 1985, c. 242, § 27; Laws 1992, c. 132, § 2; Laws 1993, c. 271, § 1.

ADDENDUM "C

U.C.A. 1953 § 31A-21-308
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 31 A. INSURANCE CODE
CHAPTER 21. INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN GENERAL
PART 3. SPECIFIC CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS
Current through End of 2004 4th Sp. Sess.

§ 31A-21-308. Limitations on loss to be borne by insurer
(1) An insurance policy indemnifying an insured against loss may by clear
language limit the part of the loss to be paid by the insurer to a specified or determinable
maximum amount, to loss in excess of a specified or determinable amount, to a specified
proportion of the loss which may vary with the amount of the loss, or to any combination
of these methods. If the policy covers various risks, different limitations may be provided
separately for each risk, if the policy clearly states that.
(2) A policy indemnifying an insured against loss of or damage to property may
limit the part of the loss to be paid by the insurer to a percentage of the total loss that
corresponds to the ratio of the insured sum to a specified percentage of the value of the
insured property.

Laws 1985, c. 242, § 26.
Current through End of 2004 4th Sp. Sess.
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
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1

SALT LAKE CITY, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, 2005, 9:20 AM
P R O C E E D I N G S

2

THE COURT:

3

Mr. Schultz, Do you agree that

4

there are no issues of fact, material issues of fact

5

that would preclude the summary judgment one way or the

6

other and, if you know of any, tell me what you think

7

they might be.
MR. SCHULTZ: I think Your Honor, for purposes

8
9

of this motion I do not think there are any material

10

issues of fact.

11

reason.

And why I say it that way is for this

12

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

13

MR. SCHULTZ:

For purposes of this motion we

14

are assuming that the three individuals, Mr. Pacheco,

15

Mr. Olmos, and Ms. Martinez would qualify as insureds

16

and we are assuming that for purposes of this motion

17

that there would be some liability if the case were to

18

go to trial, some negligence.

19

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

20

MR. SCHULTZ:

Because if you don't assume

21

that, there really isn't an issue that has to be

22

decided. The real issue here is strictly a legal one;

23

that is, assuming those things as factual, what is the

24

limit of liability for payment to one person. So I guess

25

with that explanation I hope that didn't confuse the

Page 4

1

matter but--

2

THE COURT: I think it's just a long yes.

3

MR. SCHULTZ:

4

THE COURT: Let me just ask you also: One

Yeah. Right.

5

thing I was puzzled about, I understand, of course, how

6

the parties have agreed that Mr. Pacheco is an insured,

7

I understand how Mr. Olmos, who is the driver, is an

8

insured.

9

Martinez is an insured.

Then it's agreed, I guess, as well that Ms.

10

just out of curiosity?

11

MR. SHULTZ:

How does she get that status,

Well, she was a passenger in the

12

car, Your Honor, who was apparently involved in some

13

kind of an argument or fight with one or more of the

14

other people in the vehicle.

15

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

16

MR. SCHULTZ: And I will acknowledge that

17

initially that was an issue that we disputed, that she

18

would not be an insured but after, I am sure George can

19

r e m i n d me of the name of the c a s e .

20

MR. W A D D O U P S :

21

MR. SCHULTZ:

Speros.

Yeah, the Speros case from the

22

Utah Supreme Court that came down after we initially

23

looked at this matter ruled that a passenger in such a

24

circumstance could be considered a permissive user of

25

the vehicle and, therefore, an insured.
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1

THE COURT: Be that as it may, it's agreed for

2

purposes of this hearing at least that all three of them

3

are insured, that State Farm had issued a policy of

4

insurance to Mr. Pacheco, who was the owner of this

5

vehicle, and that State Farm as insurer then would have

6

some liability.

7

are no facts that would preclude a summary judgment one

8

way or the other.

9

and particularly even read the case, one of the cases

So you have agreed, then, that there

As I said, I've read your memorandum

10

that you have cited, I believe it was the Noel case,

11

Murbach versus Noel.

12

else that you would like to say in support of your

13

motion for summary judgment?
MR. SCHULTZ:

14
15

try to make it quick.

16

THE COURT:

17
18

So, Counsel, is there anything

Well, yes, just briefly, I'll

Go ahead.

Say what you would

like.
MR. SCHULTZ:

Thank you. I guess the key

19

thing here, Your Honor, is the language, is the

20

Liability Coverage A, Section 1 language of the policy

21

that we quoted in our memo which states: "The amount of

22

bodily injury liability coverage is shown on the

23

declarations page under Limits of Liability Coverage A,

24

bodily injury each person, each accident. And just for

25

the own benefit, Your Honor, this is just a sheet that I
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1

pulled up that shows it's a 50/100 policy and I don't

2

think there's any dispute about that.

3

THE COURT: I don't think there is either.

I

4

think the whole-- the knub of the thing is, is it

5

$50,000 obviously per person per accident or $50,000 per

6

person per insured per accident.

7

MR. SCHULTZ:

Right. And that's where I think

8

the language, as you read the policy it says, "Each

9

person is the amount of coverage for all damages due to

10

bodily injury to one person." And then below that a

11

little ways it says:

12

amount of coverage subject to the amount shown under

13

each person for all damages due to bodily injury to two

14

or more persons in the same accident."

15

probably critical statement here is: "The limits of

16

liability are not increased because more than one person

17

may be an insured." So, in other words, the policy

18

that's sold provides up to a maximum of $50,000 for all

19

damages to one person in one accident and a maximum of

20

$100,000 to all persons injured in one accident. No one

21

person can get more than 50 and all the people injured

22

in any one accident combined can't receive more than

23

$100,000.

24

fact that the limits are not increased because more than

25

one person is insured, you have to-- essentially you

"Under each accident is the total

And then the

Now, if that last phrase has any meaning, the
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1

have to write that phrase out of the policy, is our

2

position, Your Honor, if you accept the position that

3

Ms. DeHerrera is taking here, because it says in no

4

uncertain terms that the limits of liability are not

5

increased because more than one person is an insured and

6

that-- and the total amount that can be paid for any one

7

person for all injuries is $50,000.
Now, if you were to-- and the Murbach case,

8
9

as you noted, it's this exact issue and it's a case

10

where two people were sued as defendants, they were both

11

insureds, they actually had a trial and got a verdict of

12

300 some-odd thousand.

13

had already paid the $100,000.

14

they had already paid the $100,000 and the plaintiffs

15

tried to garnish and get another $100,000 and the Court

16

said:

17

person $200,000, and that's not what the policy says.

The insurer, liability insurer,
Out of a 100/200 policy

No, because that would make the limit for one

18

Any interpretation-- even if you look at this

19

and say:

20

that interpretation has to be a plausible interpretation

21

and it has to be consistent with all parts of the

22

policy.

23

you have more than one insured involved in an accident

24

in a vehicle, if it is not-- it doesn't promote a

25

plausible or a reasonable result because it makes that--

Well, it's subject to some interpretation,

If you interpret this to mean that every time
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1

it actually makes the per accident limit meaningless,

2

too, because the policy says maximum of $100,000 for any

3

accident for all injured persons.

4

Ms. DeHerrera is taking here the per person limit is

5

more than the per accident limit now, because she claims

6

that all three of the insureds should have to pay up to

7

$50,000 which would extend the per person coverage to

8

$150,000 which is fifty more than the per accident

9

coverage.

10
11

Under the theory that

The other things that makes it implausible,

Your Honor-THE COURT: Well, I guess--

I'm sorry to

12

interrupt you, Counsel, but Mr. Waddoups would say that

13

the same interpretation would apply, it would be

14

$100,000 per accident but it means $100,000 per insured

15

per accident.

16

insured, if there were three people insured and you had

17

more than one person injured, then the total could be

18

$300,000 as opposed to $100,000.

19

So if there are more than one person

MR. S C H U L T Z :

Yeah, and y o u could m a k e

that

20

a r g u m e n t , he p r o b a b l y would m a k e that a r g u m e n t ,

Your

21

Honor. And, again, I would go back to the language that

22

the limits of liability are not increased regardless of

23

whether there is more than one insured and unless you

24

essentially write that out of the policy and make it

25

meaningless, you can't enforce or you are not enforcing
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1

the policy as written.

The other thing that I would

2

just point out that the theory here changes the limits

3

of liability with the number of people that might be in

4

the car.

5

pointed to speaks in terms of mandatory coverage on the

6

vehicle, not on the insured people but on the vehicle,

7

and Utah requires at least $25,000 per injured person,

8

$50,000 per accident on the vehicle. And if you, just

9

maybe taking an example here, let's say you had one of

10

those panel vans that can hold up to, who knows, 10 or

11

12 people, theoretically at least under the DeHerrera

12

approach here, if you had that panel van insured at

13

100/200 like in the Murbach case and you had 10 people

14

in that vehicle, potentially you've got a million dollar

15

per person coverage now on a van that on the policy

16

phase is $100,000 per person.

17

that this language covers, that you don't increase the

18

limit just because more than one person might be an

19

insured. And to do that in the face of this language

20

would, Your Honor, in our view be going against the

21

plain language of the policy and you would have to, as I

22

said, write it out of the policy.

23

guess the other point on that, Your Honor, is that the

24

argument has been made, that:

25

liability coverage is to protect-- is to provide

And the statute, the mandatory statute that I

And that's the very point

And so our-- and I

Well, the purpose of
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coverage for injured persons and it does provide a
benefit for injured persons -- that's true. But this
theory that's being espoused doesn't really have
anything to do-- I mean logically with the severity of
the injury.

If there had only been one driver who owned

this car, there would be no argument here that:

Well,

the coverage should be higher because the injury was
severe.

So it goes back to my point that this theory

changes the limits just based on the number of people in
the car. And so, Your Honor, the bottom line is, and
you, obviously, see this clearly, and that is that we
think that the language that says the limits cannot be
increased regardless of the number of people who may be
insured is clear, should be enforced, and that the fact
that State Farm has already paid the $50,000 for the
maximum amount payable to one person should end the
matter and that we would ask that Your Honor rule as a
matter of law and declare that this policy limit for
injuries to one person is $50,000 regardless of the
number of potential insureds.
THE COURT:

All right, sir.

MR. SCHULTZ:
THE COURT:

Thank you very much.

Mr. Waddoups, do you agree as

well that there are no genuine issues of material fact
as to preclude a summary judgment and if you don't
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1

agree, tell me what they are.
MR. WADDOUPS:

2

Well, I think the issue is the

3

interpretation of the policy and the Court it looks like

4

they have enough facts to make that determination and I

5

would agree.

I am prepared to tell--

6

THE COURT: Well, you are the opponent--

7

MR. WADDOUPS:

8

THE COURT: You oppose this motion so,

9

I am.

obviously, it would be your responsibility if you think

10

there are facts that would keep me from ruling today,

11

either in your favor or your opponent's favor, I would

12

be interested in knowing what those facts are because

13

they would have to be resolved at trial.
MR. WADDOUPS: Sure.

14

And I could go ahead and

15

respond to Mr. Schultz and if you think that there's

16

something in there that you think may be a disputed fact

17

that troubles you, then you could reserve ruling.
THE COURT:

18
19

right now.
MR. WADDOUPS:

20
21

But you can't identify any fact

I'm not identifying anything

right now.

22

THE COURT:

Okay.

23

MR. WADDOUPS:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. WADDOUPS: I think it's important, Your

That would preclude us--

Okay.

Go ahead.
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Honor, to look at a little bit of brief history. In
dealing with the insurance industry you find in many
cases insurance companies will do everything they can to
get out of paying the coverage. In this particular case
State Farm followed its normal path.

We filed a claim

on behalf of Ruby DeHerrera who was hurt extremely bad
in this case.

There was alcohol involved on the

participants and as a result she was hurt very
seriously, had a massive scar on her face, and other
injuries, she flat-lined, she was life-flighted. State
Farm took the position that they would extend coverage
to Pacheco, the owner of the car, to Olmos, the driver
of the car, but they would not extend coverage to
Martinez who grabbed, alleged grabbed the steering
wheel. They also said that she was not a permissive user
of the car, so that was her second point of contention.
And the third point of contention was that even if she
was a covered person, even if she was a permissive user,
her acts were intentional and therefore under their
policy -- and all three arguments are based on their
policy language -- that intentional acts would void the
coverage.
THE COURT:

But they've changed their

position now.
MR. WADDOUPS:

Well, we have argued with them
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1

years, and years, and years, and finally our Supreme

2

Court has ruled and knocked them down on every single

3

point which is showing their policy is in violation of

4

the law here in Utah.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. WADDOUPS:

Okay.
Interestingly, they cite the

7

Court an Illinois court, a case where prior courts in

8

Illinois had ruled directly opposite Speros which is our

9

Utah Supreme Court, for the very issues I just cited to

10

the judge: coverage, permissive user, and intentional

11

conduct. In those the Illinois court would deny coverage

12

in Utah under Speros, which is rendered in 2 0 04, that

13

does not preclude coverage. There's three other

14

jurisdictions, there's Pennsylvania, there's Oregon,

15

which is a State Farm case again, a grabbing the

16

steering wheel case, that was in 1983, there's a

17

permissive case out of Oregon, or Pennsylvania 2000, and

18

there is a State Farm case in Illinois, again, where

19

they all-- both courts all ruled opposite Speros.

20

our point is our jurisdiction doesn't look too close to

21

other jurisdictions for determination of the issue.

22

Turning now to--

23

THE COURT:

So

Let me follow up with a question.

24

You are saying that Murbach versus Noel is not good law,

25

it's from another state, they don't agree with Utah
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1

generally speaking. And then I don't recall that you

2

cited any case that would support your position.
MR. WADDOUPS:

3
4

there.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. WADDOUPS:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. WADDOUPS:

9

There's no other cases out

Okay.
You've got all the cases.

All right.
And the three cases I just

cited to you of the grabbing the steering wheel are the

10

other three cases in other jurisdictions that rule

11

opposite Speros.

12
13

THE COURT:

On Speros, looking at the issue

here, we are sort of past that.

14

MR. WADDOUPS: All right.

15

THE COURT: I think State Farm for the

16

purposes of this area has agreed all three of those

17

people are insureds, no dispute about that.

18

MR. WADDOUPS: Right.

19

THE COURT: So that's not a problem.

But

20

looking at the issue of the interpretation of this

21

contract, they cited Murbach versus Noel and you say

22

that's really not good law. I'm just asking:

23

some other case on this issue that supports that?

24
25

Is there

MR. WADDOUPS: Speros gets close and I'll talk
to you about that in a minute. That's the 2 004 case.
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1

The reason I bring that up is because they were relying

2

on policy language in their own policy for those other

3

three issues where the Court has said--

4

I told you once or twice, they have had a history of

5

this. That's not policy-MR. SCHULTZ:

6

State Farm, as

Your Honor, I object to this

7

bantering and commenting about a history of this or

8

that.

9

counsel ought to get to the point.

This is a clearcut legal issue and I think

THE COURT:

10
11

legal issue here.

Yeah, I want to focus on the

Go ahead.

MR. WADDOUPS:

12

Okay. I'm going to.

On Page 8

13

of our memorandum we state that the policy says

14

unequivocally that they will pay damages for which an

15

insured, an insured is legally liable up to the amount

16

of $50,000 for bodily injury to one person.

17

you don't have a lot of cases, Judge, where you have got

18

multiple insureds contributing to the cause of the

19

accident.

20

covered, we do have a stipulation that they are all

21

negligent. In many of those cases where you do have

22

multiple defendants , multiple insureds , in many cases

23

you will try the case separately.

24

against Pacheco, we would have a trial against Olmos, we

25

would have a trial against Martinez.

Typically

We do have a stipulation that they are all

We would have a trial

Usually, at the

Page 16

request of the insuring company who doesn't want to be
prejudiced with all the conduct together and all the
issues together.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. WADDOUPS:

If we were to get a judgment

against Pacheco for $60,000, the policy paid $50,000; if
we were to get a judgment against Olmos for $60,000, the
policy would pay $50,000; if we were to get a judgment
against Martinez for $60,000, the policy would pay
$50,000. If, however, we did Martinez first and they
paid their $50,000, that's all we're going to pay, the
other two insureds would be very, very upset that they
are not getting the benefits of the coverage. And that's
where you see, in some of these cases, where you see the
bad faith claims.

State Farm in their very own policy

says: We are going to pay you, pay on your behalf as an
insured up to $50,000.

They don't do any examples in

their policy, they don't do any qualifiers in their
policy that makes it expressly clear to Pacheco, to
Olmos, or Martinez that somehow if you're all negligent
and you're all over the limit, we're going to have to
divide up the fifty and only pay sixteen and some odd
dollars per person. If they did do it that way, Your
Honor, they would be in direct violation of the
financial responsibility section.

We disagree with Mr.

Page 1

1

Schultz's and State Farm's position. They have to cover

2

these people at a minimum to $25,000 per person under

3

the financial responsibility section. And what they are

4

trying to do and what they're trying to argue to the

5

Court is they are only obligated as they construe the

6

policy up to sixteen some-odd dollars.

7

they have got to cover up to $75,000 under the statute

8

as a minimum, otherwise, they're not following the law

9

as to each insured having $25,000 in coverage if they

So at a minimum

10

have liability.

We know under the comparative

11

negligence statute here in Utah each negligent party is

12

only responsible for their portion, proportionate share

13

in a case. So if Pacheco has got the liability of

14

$75,000, State Farm has got to pay 50% per the clause

15

they just read, and so on and so forth for each insured.

16

There is no-- We go through these motions a lot, Your

17

Honor. I just would like to point out this point. I had

18

a case with Allied once.

19

that took different positions on the policy language and

20

said it was clear.

21

had different positions who said the policy was clear.

22

We have State Farm's position in this case, we have our

23

position.

24

district said:

25

taking a different position?

They had two defense lawyers

We had two plaintiffs lawyers who

And the judge in that case here in this
How could it be clear when everyone is
If a policy language is
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subject to different interpretations, if it's ambiguous,
then the insurer loses.

That's the status of law here

in Utah and the status of law in almost every state in
the United States.

We have read this policy, it cannot

possibly mean what State Farm wants it to mean.

We

understand why they want to try to do what they're doing
but it can't possibly mean what they are trying to say
it means.
As to the Speros case, in the Speros-THE COURT:

Let me ask a question, Mr.

Waddoups, before you go further.
MR. WADDOUPS:

Sure.

THE COURT: Now, looking at the language that
you both cited, that language from the policy or the
contract that talks about the limits, and I'll just read
from the-- one of the memoranda. It says: "Each person.
Each accident. Under each person is the amount of
coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to one
person. Bodily injury to one person includes all injury
and damages to others resulting from this bodily injury,
emotional distress, et cetera."
So I think what the plaintiff is saying, and
I would like to have you respond to this: In order to
interpret that provision the way you have asked me to
interpret it, it would have to say something to the
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1

effect: Under each person is the amount of coverage for

2

all damages due to bodily injury to one person per each

3

insured or for each insured, or something.

4

require that we add some additional language so it's not

5

just a limit per person but it's a limit per person per

6

insured. Do you agree with that and how would you want

7

to respond to that?
MR. WADDOUPS:
THE COURT:

Well, I--

It would

that--

In other words, this is the plain

language that this is a per person limit -- period.

It

doesn't say per person per insured, it just says per
person.
MR. WADDOUPS: For each person's own
responsibility or negligence.
THE COURT: But it doesn't say that.
MR. WADDOUPS: But that's what the statute
says. That's what they're responsible for and then the
clause that I have read before says: "State Farm,"
quote, will pay damages for which an insured-THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

MR. WADDOUPS:

You've got Pacheco is an

insured, you have got Olmos, and you have got Martinez.
It doesn't say all three together or all of them
together is legally liable up to the amount of $50,000.
It doesn't say insureds, they put an S on insured,
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1

| they've buffed off the S. They didn't make it plural,

2

| it's singular.

3

|

4

I apologize for that. But I have another question but--

5

| And then the other language. "Limits of liability are

6

I not increased because more than one person, or

7

organization," which isn't critical here, but

8

than one person may be an insured."

9

MR. WADDOUPS:

10

THE COURT: I didn't mean to interrupt you.

THE COURT:

"--more

And we are not--

When you throw that into the mix,

11

how do you-- setting the statute and your argument

12

there, aside from that, just focusing on the issue that

13

you raised of contract interpretation, how would you

14

interpret the contract, using all of that language any

15

way other than this is a per person limit.

16

I

MR. WADDOUPS:

Traditionally, you're talking

17

about increasing the policy limits, assuming that the

18

policy limits are $50,000.

19

THE COURT:

And they are.

20

MR. WADDOUPS:

Traditionally, when you're

21

saying increase the policy limits, you're saying the

22

policy limits are 60 or 70, and where that comes

23

through, where that comes about is in many cases an

24

insurance company will not pay a claim, they're refusing

25

to pay a claim.

So their insured gets sued and then
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1

they go to court.

Well, if you follow certain

2

procedures, you follow Dameron procedures, that insured.

3

If they get hit for a judgment greater than the policy

4

of fifty; for example, a hundred, then you're into an

5

excess claim and then the insurance company will come in

6

and pay the total judgment where the policy limits are

7

now increased from fifty to a hundred.

8

policy is saying is:

9

that happens on occasion even in spite of their language

And what this

We're not going to do that. But

10

if they force their insured into litigation and they

11

have got to now come in and say,

12

litigation. That's what State Farm versus Campbell was

13

all about.

14

pay it--

15

refused to pay it, they went to court, they got hit for

16

two-fifty, they wouldn't pay it, and then ended up

17

paying, as you know, multi-millions of dollars to their

18

insured. This policy is saying:

19

increase our policy limits. We are not asking them to

20

increase their policy limits.

21

have to pay sixty to seventy per insured. We are saying

22

you have to pay $50,000 for each insured's negligent

23

conduct.

24

say:

25

in any one accident may be legally liable.

Well, we took you into

They had a two-fifty policy, they wouldn't

or $25,000 policy, they wouldn't pay it, they

We are not going to

We are not saying you

If they wanted to make this clear, they would

We will pay damages for which all of our insureds
And they
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1

I d i d n ' t do t h a t .

T h e y left it s i n g u l a r b e c a u s e if they

2

I t r i e d to do that they w o u l d be in v i o l a t i o n of case law,

3

( s t a t u t e s , a n d p u b l i c p o l i c y , b e c a u s e U t a h has a

4

| financial responsibility

5

| $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 p e r insured.

6

| so t h e y ' r e - - w h e n y o u look at this l a n g u a g e , us being

7

( the i n s u r a n c e

that y o u have got to have

So that a n s w e r s that q u e s t i o n . A n d

industry, they are trying to say: We are

n o t g o i n g t o g o to GO or 7 0 , w e are not going
9

in

to

( i n c r e a s e o u r p o l i c y , t h e y are trying to be firm in that

10

| r e g a r d . T h e y do o p e n t h e m s e l v e s up w h e n they g o

11

| litigation.

12

I of an e x c e s s and the v e r d i c t c o m e s b a c k part of

into

It's called D a m e r o n . Y o u put them on notice

i n s u r e d s w i l l come in and p a y o v e r

the

13

policy. Most

and

14

a b o v e t h e p o l i c y in spite of t h e i r l a n g u a g e b e c a u s e

15

k n o w they are in t r o u b l e . But w e are not asking them to

16

d o that in this c a s e .

they

T h a t ' s simply not the issue.

17

THE COURT: Okay.

18

MR. W A D D O U P S :

A s to S p e r o s , and I'll

give

19

y o u a c o p y b e f o r e we l e a v e , S p e r o s is a case

where

20

t h e y ' r e d r i v i n g d o w n the road and Fricke w a s driving,

21

a n d H y a t t r e a c h e d over and g r a b b e d the wheel and

22

crashed.

23

r e f u s e d to d e f e n d H y a t t , the p a s s e n g e r , let a default

24

judgment g o a g a i n s t them,

25

in this c a s e , let a default judgment go

I n t e r e s t i n g l y e n o u g h in that case State

they
Farm

just like t h e y ' r e g o i n g to do
against
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1

Martinez.
MR. SCHULTZ:

2
3

commentary.

I mean, my goodness--

4

MR. WADDOUPS:

5

MR. SCHULTZ:

6

Well, that's-There's no default judgment

being entered and he knows it.

7
8

Your Honor, I object to this

MR. WADDOUPS: Well, you wanted to.

That's

the paperwork.

9

THE COURT:

I'll try to sort through it.

If

10

I think they're irrelevancies I'll disregard that. Go

11

ahead, Mr. Waddoups.

12

MR. WADDOUPS: So, anyway, Speros' own

13

insurance company paid it and then they went after the

14

insurance company after the responsible insurance

15

company, Nationwide, hits Fricke and Hyatt. In the

16

Speros court, if you read it very carefully, what the

17

Court said is: Yes, you do have-- Hyatt is a permissive

18

user, Hyatt's intentional conduct does not void the

19

policy, which they tried to do in this particular case

20

at issue.

21

against the driver in the case--

22

company for Speros, Your Honor, needed both insureds to

23

pay under the policy. You know, whether it's 50/100,

24

25/50, they needed both to get recouped all their

25

losses. So they went to Hyatt. That's not enough. Then

And they said the reason you can't recover
See, the insurance
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1

| t h e y w e n t to F r i c k e , the d r i v e r , and: We want

2

| money,

3

| c o u l d n ' t do t h a t .

4

| T h e o n l y r e a s o n t h e y couldn't r e c o v e r is b e c a u s e of the

5

| m o t i o n for s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t , that N a t i o n w i d e had

6

| an a f f i d a v i t

7

| plaintiffs

too.

If y o u listen to State Farm's p o s i t i o n , you
O u r Courts said y o u could do that.

saying Fricke wasn't n e g l i g e n t .
in Speros didn't file a

s a y i n g Fricke w a s n e g l i g e n t .
9

your

filed

The

counter-affidavit

A n d that's w h y they didn't

I get a n y r e c o v e r y o n the same p o l i c y they p a i d

under

10

| H y a t t , for H y a t t .

So in the Speros c a s e , and y o u can

11

I read it for y o u r s e l f , they got a r e c o v e r y from Hyatt

12

u n d e r the p o l i c y and they w a n t e d a n o t h e r r e c o v e r y

for

13

F r i c k e , but they didn't do a c o u n t e r - a f f i d a v i t

14

disputed

15

lost o n n e g l i g e n c e as to F r i c k e .

16

s t i p u l a t i o n as to n e g l i g e n c e , all three are n e g l i g e n t ,

17

so t h e Court here is not concerned w i t h t h a t . M a y I

18

approach.

to

facts as to the issue of n e g l i g e n c e . So they

19

THE C O U R T : Y o u may.

20

MR. W A D D O U P S :

In our case we have a

So I w i l l let y o u read

that

21

and d r a w y o u r o w n c o n c l u s i o n s .

S o , in summary, we have

22

a s i t u a t i o n w h e r e y o u h a v e the p o l i c y that

23

p o l i c y language that indicates to the insured, w h i c h we

24

t h i n k is clear, that for each insured they are

25

r e s p o n s i b l e up to $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 , State Farm has got to pay. At

indicates,
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1

a minimum the statute says you have got to pay $25,000

2

per insured in this case.

3

have the competing clauses which I've referred to, at a

4

minimum you have ambiguity on what they're going to pay

5

and what they're entitled to, or responsible for, and so

6

if there is any ambiguity, I guess there is if we're

7

arguing it, then the insured loses anyway. So we have

8

asked the Court to rule in our favor in two, one of two

9

ways. Number 1, order that Pacheco, Olmos and Martinez

10

have exposure up to $50,000 each out of the policy; or

11

Number 2, at a minimum they have exposure up to $25,000

12

under the financial responsibility section which is

13

31A-22-304.

14

issue with State Farm's interpretation of that statute.

15

We do a lot of legislation in our office and it has got

16

to be per person.

17

have insurance and you drive you are in violation of the

18

criminal law. It's not per car, it's per person.

19

If it's not clear and you

We do a lot of legislation here. We take

As a matter of fact, if you don't

THE COURT: Now, can you point to any language

20

in the Speros case, Mr. Waddoups, that would support

21

your interpretation of either the statute or the

22

contract? I have got the statute in front of me, you

23

cited it in your memorandum, it says--

24

MR. WADDOUPS: I can point to you--

25

THE COURT:

Go ahead.
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MR. WADDOUPS:

1

Where they have recovered

2

under Hyatt, we have to go back to the determination on

3

how much, and as to whether-- See, then State Farm tried

4

to say they needed to litigate the Hyatt case even

5

though they let a default judgment go against them. The

6

Court was troubled by that, but I could point you to the

7

language where they said you could also recover under

8

Speros but you didn't file a counter-affidavit saying

9

they're negligent. So, therefore, you lose on the issue

10

of negligence.

11

THE COURT: Yeah. I see. All right. Thank you.

12

MR. SCHULTZ:

13

THE COURT:

14

Your Honor.

Mr. Schultz, go ahead if you have

anything else you would like to respond to.
MR. SCHULTZ:

15

Yes.

Let me just address a few

16

of these points.

I want to make one thing really clear

17

if I didn't in response to your first question about

18

facts.

19

motion, Your Honor, that we're not here to dispute

20

whether there is liability. We have not stipulated that

21

if Your Honor were to rule that there is more coverage

22

available that that issue has been resolved; in other

23

words, if there had to be a trial on this case,

24

plaintiff, DeHerrera still has to prove these issue of

25

negligence against these various parties. This was just

That we have stipulated for purposes of this
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1

for the purposes of the motion.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. SCHULTZ:

4

THE COURT:--is to determine how much coverage

5

The declaratory judgment-Right.

is provided.

6

MR. SCHULTZ: Right.

7

THE COURT: By the insured, not whether

8
9

Martinez or someone else was responsible-MR. SCHULTZ:

Yes.

10

THE COURT: --for the negligence.

11

MR. SCHULTZ:

Now, let me just say counsel

12

suggested that just because we are here arguing about

13

this must prove that the policy is ambiguous. That goes

14

directly counter to Utah law. The First American Title

15

Company case that we cited says--

16

Alf case says: "Policy terms are not necessarily

17

ambiguous simply because one party seeks to endow them

18

with a different interpretation according to his or her

19

own interests."

20

we would never be able to have a declaratory judgment

21

ruled on as a matter of law if simply because parties

22

disagreed on it that made it ambiguous.

or, excuse me.

The

And, obviously, we would never have--

23

Now, as far as the statute is concerned, Your

24

Honor, I would submit to you that the statute is clearly

25

tied to vehicles and not to persons insured. If you look

Page 2{

1

I at Utah Code Annotated Section 31A-22-303, it mandates

2

motor vehicle insurance coverage. It requires an owner's

3

policy to provide insurance for the named insured and

4

person's using with permission, and so forth, subject

5

to-- and this is a direct quote, "--subject to limits

6

for each motor vehicle m

7

minimum limits specified under Section 31A-22-304."

amounts not less than the

8

THE COURT: Where were you reading from?

9

MR. SCHULTZ:

10

I was reading on page 9 of my

reply memo but--

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. SCHULTZ:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. SCHULTZ:

Oh, I didn't find it.
It actually is from 31A-22-304.
Okay.
Of the statute. So what it's

15

saying is:

The owner's policy has to have coverage for

16

the named insured, persons using the vehicle with the

17

named insured's permission, and resident relatives

18

subject to limits for each motor vehicle m

19

less than the minimum limits specified under 31A-22-304.

20

And when you go to 31A-22-304, which I've quoted on page

21

8 of my reply memo, it sets out, "Their policies

22

containing motor vehicle liability coverage may not

23

limit the insured's liability under that coverage below

24

the following."

25

because of liability or bodily injury to or death of one

amounts not

And then the first one is $25,000
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person arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any
one accident."

And then, "Second, $50,000 because of

liability for bodily injury to or death of two or more
persons arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any
one accident."

And then you can even get a $65,000

combined coverage for property and bodily injury
although that's not in effect here.

But, clearly, when

you combine those two statutes that the coverage is tied
to the vehicle, you have to have that minimum amount of
coverage on the vehicle and the language m

the policy,

as you very clearly have pointed out, does not say per
injured person per insured. And you would have to write
that m

to follow the DeHerrera claim.

Your question

about what the language of the policy or the amount, the
limits of liability are not increased. The response to
that by Mr. Waddoups I think is not germane to this
issue. What he was-- he was talking about whether or not
more than the policy limit would have to be paid if an
excess verdict was rendered. And his example was against
a single insured. That's not what this provision is
talking about.

This is saying: We have the limits, we

clearly identified on the coverage amounts that each
person is the amount of coverage for all damages due to
one person in the accident, and then we're saying, and
those limits are not increased even though more than one
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person might be an insured. And we would submit, Your
Honor, that you can rule that that's the limit as a
matter of law.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Counsel.
MR. WADDOUPS:

I just have the-- I have a

copy of that indicated that they were going to try to
take a default judgment and he said no. I have a
pleading if you want to see it.
THE COURT:

Well, I believe you.

At least

for the purpose of this argument I don't know that I
disagree with you, and I don't think that you do either,
Counsel.
MR. WADDOUPS:
that.

He said he didn't try to do

I have the pleadings here.
MR. SCHULTZ:

No, that's not what 1 said.

You said that you were trying to take a default
j udgment.
MR. WADDOUPS:

No.

I said defendant, State

Farm, was trying to take it.
MR. SCHULTZ:
MR. WADDOUPS:

That's not what-State Farm in this case hired

other attorneys to defend this case.
MR. SCHULTZ:
to--

Your Honor, I've got to object

None of this is in the record on this motion.
THE COURT: I'll just say--
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MR. WADDOUPS:

Well, State Farm knows their

position that they think there is coverage up to
$50,000.
MR. SCHULTZ:
THE COURT:

Your Honor--

Well, I'll just assume for the

sake of argument that what you represented is true, Mr.
Waddoups, and I don't want to~MR. WADDOUPS:

Okay.

THE COURT: If we have to take facts,
evidence, we have to take testimony in some case then
there is no-- I simply couldn't rule as a matter of law,
there would be genuine issues of material fact and I
understand there may be some dispute m

the

preliminaries leading up to this hearing.
MR. WADDOUPS:

The only reason I mentioned

that because when we were talking about interpretation,
the very lawyers they hired to defend the people have a
different opinion from this particular State Farm
attorney.
THE COURT:

I see.

MR. WADDOUPS: That's why I wanted to bring
that up to you.
THE COURT:

Could be.

All right.

Thank you

Counsel, I'm ready to rule. I have had an
adequate opportunity and it seems to me that the issues
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1

here aren't complex, they may not be simple, they may

2

not be easy to divine but they are not complex.

3

read the memoranda, I've read the provisions in both the

4

statute and the policy, and I'm prepared to give you a

5

ruling today. And, then, of course, Counsel, let what

6

you do with that whatever you like.

7

I've

It is an interesting issue, it certainly is,

8

but I would conclude, first of all, as I say, I

9

certainly can't make findings, but I would conclude,

10

first of all, that there are no genuine issues of

11

material fact that would preclude summary judgment

12

today.

13

any issues of material fact that would need to be

14

resolved by a trier of fact in a trial.

15

agree with both of you, there certainly are no genuine

16

issues of material fact that would preclude summary

17

judgment.

18

Both counsel agree. Neither of you have cited

So, and I would

Second, I would conclude that neither the

19

contract in this case, meaning the insurance policy, nor

20

the statute cited by the defendant are ambiguous in my

21

judgment. The language is clear in both of those. And,

22

of course, when the language is clear I am not to resort

23

to any sort of extrinsic evidence to clear up or clarify

24

what the contract might mean, I'm to use the common

25

sense language of the contract, interpret it the way
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1

ordinary people would as they read it, and I think I can

2

do that here.

3

statute or the contract are vague in any way.

As I say, I don't think either the

4

In my judgment, starting first with the--

5

Well, strike that. I will back up. The defendant has

6

argued that it would be a violation of public policy to

7

interpret the insurance policy the way the plaintiff

8

would ask me to do.

9

appear to be the most significant of the defendant's

I disagree with that. That doesn't

10

arguments.

Mr. Waddoups didn't spend much time with

11

that here today and I don't see any violation of public

12

policy if I were to interpret the contract the way the

13

plaintiff has asked me to do.
Second, going to the contract itself, in my

14
15

judgment, reading both the language that I have already

16

read, and the other simple sentence that follows it,

17

it's my judgment that it is clear that the language of

18

the contract is to provide a limit of $50,000 per

19

person.

20

question, to interpret it otherwise would require the

21

addition of some language that just isn't there.

22

language says, "That the amount of property damage, the

23

amount of bodily injury liability coverage as shown on

24

the declaration page under each person is the amount of

25

coverage for all damages due to the bodily injury to one

As I indicated or sought information in my

The
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person."

There's no language that says per insured.

And, then, further, if that weren't clear at all, that
sentence that follows it, "The limits of liability are
not increased because more than one person may be an
insured," makes it clear to me that it was the intent of
those who drafted this contract, this policy of
insurance, to limit liability to $50,000 per person per
accident and not vary that limit with the number of
people who may have been insured at any particular given
time, because that's just what it says, "Liability is
not increased because there may be more than one insured
person." To change that to interpret it the way that the
defendant has asked me to interpret it, again, I would
think you would need to add language that just simply
isn't there to rewrite the contract and say that the
limits of liability are not increased because more than
one person may be an insured, to strike that and say
that the limits of liability will not be increased,
well, would require some other interpretation than what
the language clearly says. So in my judgment, again, I
would conclude that the language limits the liability of
the plaintiff in this case to $50,000 per person, not
$50,000 per person per insured. And the same would be
true with the statute in my judgment, the $25,000
minimum requirement in the statute is tied to the
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vehicle involved, not the number of people who may be in
the vehicle who would be covered by the insurance, it
requires at least $25,000 per injured person. There's no
requirement in the statute of $25,000 per injured person
per insured person. I would disagree with the
defendant's interpretation.
So having found that there are no genuine
issues of material fact, and agreeing with the arguments
of the plaintiff on all three of those points raised by
the defendant in his memorandum, I would find that the
plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
and, Mr. Schultz, I would ask you to prepare the order
consistent with that and I'll take away (inaudible).
MR. SCHULTZ: Thank you, I will do that.
THE COURT:

Now, Counsel, since you're

preparing that, is there anything that I've left unclear
that you need to have resolved today in order to prepare
those documents?
MR. SCHULTZ:
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SCHULTZ:
THE COURT:

No.

Thank you.

Thank you, Counsel.

[Proceedings concluded at 10:04 a.m.]
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' K"ti Judicial District

AUG J 9 201
Stuart H. Schultz, #2866

Deputy Clerk

STRONG AND HANNI

Attorneys for Plaintiff
3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84180
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
Facsimile: (801)596-1508

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE FARM M U T U A L
INSURANCE COMPANY,

AUTOMOBILE

ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 030920807

vs.
RAE-ANN MARTINEZ, AN INDIVIDUAL, ROBERT
PACHECO, AN INDIVIDUAL, MANUEL OLMOS,
AND RUBY DEHERRERA, AN,

Judge Robin Reese

Defendants.

Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's ("State Farm") Motion for
Summary Judgment was heard on August 3,2005, by the Honorable Robin W. Reese, District Judge.
Stuart H. Schultz of the law firm of Strong & Hanni appeared on behalf of State Farm. George T.
Waddoups of the law firm of Robert J. Debry & Associates appeared on behalf of defendant Ruby
DeHerrera. No other defendants appeared.
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The motion for summary judgment presents a legal issue which requires the Court to interpret
an automobile insurance policy issued by State Farm to Robert Pacheco on his vehicle. This legal
issue arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on May 1^1,2003. Defendant Manuel Olmos
was the driver of the subject vehicle. Defendants Ruby DeHerrera and Rae-Ann Martinez were
passengers in the subject vehicle. The Court must determine, as a matter of law, the limits of
liability coverage available under the terms of the insurance policy for bodily injuries sustained by
Ruby DeHerrera in the subject accident.
Ruby DeHerrera has made third-party liability claims against Mr. Pacheco, Mr. Olmos and
Ms. Martinez for personal injuries. For purposes of the motion for summary judgment, it is assumed
that Robert D. Pacheco, Manual Olmos and Rae-Ann Martinez are persons negligent and insured
under the State Farm policy who could be found liable to Ruby DeHerrera for the accident and her
claimed injuries. It is undisputed that the liability limits for bodily injury under the State Farm policy
are $50,000 per person and $ 100,000 per accident. It is also undisputed that State Farm has already
paid $50,000 to Ruby DeHerrera on her third-party liability claims against Robert D. Pacheco,
Manual Olmos and Rae-Ann Martinez.
State Farm's position is that the liability limit under the insurance policy for Ruby
DeHerrera's personal injury claims against Mr. Pacheco, Mr. Olmos and Ms. Martinez is the $50,000
per injured person total. Ruby DeHerrera's position is that the per person policy limit of $50,000
applies to each person who is insured for the accident under the policy and is negligent so that the
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available policy limit for Ruby DeHerrera's claims against Mr. Pacheco, Mr. Olmos and Ms.
Martinez is $50,000 each, or a total of $150,000.
The Court, having reviewed the motion, the memoranda and other documentation filed in
support of and in opposition to the motion, having heard oral argument, being fully advised in the
premises, and good cause appearing, now, therefore.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that State Farm's Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted, and the Court declares, as a matter of law, that the limit of liability
insurance coverage for bodily injury under the insurance policy issued by State Farm on Robert
Pacheco's vehicle is $50,000 for all bodily injuries sustained in one accident by one person
regardless of whether more than one negligent person may be an insured for the accident under the
policy. Specifically, and as a matter of law, the limit of liability coverage available for all bodily
injury claims of Ruby DeHerrera from the automobile accident of May 11,2003, against all persons
insured under the State Farm policy is $50,000. The Court's Order and Summary Judgment is based
on the following reasons:
1.

There are no genuine issues of material fact which would preclude the Court from

rendering summary judgment with respect to the legal issue involved in this motion;
2.

Section I - - LIABILITY - - Coverage A of the State Farm insurance policy, under

the heading "Limits of Liability," states:
The amount of bodily injury liability coverage is shown on the declarations
page under "Limits of Liability - Coverage A - Bodily Injury. Each Person. Each
Accident." Under "Each Person" is the amount of coverage for all damages due to
bodily injury to one person. "Bodily injury to one person" includes all injury and
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damages to others resulting from this bodily injury, and all emotional distress
resulting from this bodily injury sustained by other persons who do not sustain
bodily injury. Under "Each Accident" is the total amount of coverage, subject to the
amount shown under "Each Person", for all damages due to bodily injury to two or
more persons in the same accident.

We will pay damages for which an insured is legally liable up to these
amounts.
The limits of liability are not increased because more than one person or
organization may be an insured;
3.

The above-quoted policy language is neither vague nor ambiguous and therefore, the

Court need not consider extrinsic evidence to interpret the language;
4.

The policy language unambiguously provides a limit of $50,000 in liability coverage

per injured person for one accident regardless of whether more than one person is insured for the
accident under the policy. To interpret the policy otherwise, as Ms. DeHerrera asks, would require
the Court to rewrite the contract with language that is not included in the policy. Specifically, the
policy language which states that the limits of liability are not increased because more than one
person or organization may be an insured, clearly establishes that the maximum liability coverage
available for Ruby DeHerrera's claims against Mr. Olmos, Mr. Pacheco and Ms. Martinez is the
$50,000 per person per accident limit. Ms. DeHerrera's argument seeks coverage of $50,000 per
person per insured per accident, which is contrary to the plain language of the policy; and
5.

The Court's ruling that the policy's liability limits is $50,000 for Ruby DeHerrera's

bodily injury claims against Mr. Olmos, Mr. Pacheco and Ms. Martinez does not violate Utah public
policy established by Utah Code Ann. §§31 A-22-303 and 31A-22-304 setting mandatory minimum
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motor vehicle insurance coverage limits. The Court concludes, as a matter of law, that §§ 31 A-22303 and 31A-22-304 require the minimum coverage amounts on the insured motor vehicle with
respect to an accident. Section 31 A-22-303. for example, requires that an owner's policy must
provide insurance coverage for the named insured, persons using the vehicle with the named
insured's permission, and resident relatives of the named Insured against liability arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of the motor vehicle, but all "subject to limits . . . for each motor
vehicle in amounts not less than the minimum limits specified under Section 31A-22-304 . . ."
Thus, Sections 31 A-22-303 and -304, taken together, connect the minimum limits to the automobile
involved in the accident, and not to the number of insured persons involved in the accident.
DATED this

/*/

day of August 2005.
BY THE COURT

APPROVED KS TO FORM:

V/
George*^. Waddoups
Robert J. Debry & Associates
Attorneys for Defendant Ruby DeHerrera

004409 01034

-5-

ADDENDUM "F"

SECTION I — LIABILITY — COVERAGE A
space on the declarations page.
b for first aid to others at the lime of
the accident
c
at our request
We have the right to investigate negotiate and
settle an> clairn'br suit
Coverage for the Use of Other Cars
The habjJm coverage extends to the use by an
insured of a newly acquired car* a temporary
substitute car or a non-owned car
Who Is an Insured
When we refer to your car, a newly acquired car
or a temporary substitute car% insured means
1
you,
2 your spouse,
3 the relatives of the first person named
in the declarations,
4 any other person while using such a car
if its use is within the scope of consent
of you or your spouse; and
5 any other person or organization liable
for the use of such a car by one of the
above insureds
When we refer to a non-owned car, insured
means
1 the first person named in the declarations,
2 his or her spouse,
3 their relatiyes, and
4 any person or organization which does
not own or hire the car but is liable for
its use by one of the above persons
THERE IS NO COVERAGE FOR NONOWNED CARS
1 IF THE DECLARATIONS STATE
THE "USE" OF YOUR CAR IS
OTHER THAN "PLEASURE AND
BUSINESS", OR
2 WHILE
a
BEING REPAIRED, SERVICED
OR USED BY ANY PERSON
WHILE THAT PERSON
IS
WORKING IN ANY CAR BUSINESS, OR
b USED IN ANY OTHER BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION This
does noj. apply to & private passenger car driven or occupied by the

You have this coverage if *A,% appears in the *Co\erages"
We will
1 pay damages which an insured becomes
legally liaBle to pay because of
a bodily injury to others, and
b damage to or destruction of property including )oss of its use,
caused by accident resulting from the
ownership, maintenance or use of your
car, and
2 defend any suit against an insured for
such damages with attorneys hired and
paid by us We will not defend any suit
after we have paid the applicable limit
of our liability for the accident which is
the basis of the lawsuit
In addition to the limits of liability, we will pay
for an insured any costs listed below resulting
from such accident
1 Court costs of any suit for damages that
we defend
2 Interest on damages owed by the insured due to a judgment and accruing
a after the judgment, and until we
pay, offer or deposit in court the
amount due under this coverage, or
b before the judgment, where owed
by law, ana until we pay, offer or
deposit in court the amount due under this coverage, but only on that
part of the judgment we pay
3 Premiums or costs of bonds
a to secure the release of an insured's
property attached under a court order,
b required to appeal a decision in a
suit for damages if we have not
paid our h nut "of liability that applies to the suit; and
c up to $250 for each bail bond
needed because of an accident or
related traffic law violation.
We have no duty to furnish or apply for
any bonds The amount of any bona we
pay for shall not be more than our limit
of liability
4 Expenses incurred by an insured:
a for loss of wages or salary up to
$100 per day if we ask the insured
to attend the trial of a civil suit
6
9844 4

first person named in the declarations, his or her spouse or their
-^relatives
Trailer Coverage
The liability coverage extends to the ownership
maintenance or use, oy an insured, of
1 trailers designed to be pulled by a private passenger car or a utility vehicle
except those trailers in 2 a. below
Farm implements and farm wagons are
considered trailers while pulled'on pubhe roads by a car we insure for liability
These trailers are not described in the
declarations and no extra premium is
" charged
2 the following trailers only if they are
described on the declarations page and
extra premium is paid
a
trailers designed to be pulled b\ \
private passenger car or a utility
vehicle
(1) if designed to carry persons, or
(2) while used with a motor vehicle whose use is shown a*
fct
commerciar on the declarations page (trailers used only
for pleasure use are covered
even if not described and no
extra premium paid), or
(3) while used as premises for office, store or display purposes
or
b trailers not designed to be pulled b>
a private passenger car or a utility
vehicle
When we refer to trailer co\erage r insured
means
1
you.
2 your spouse,
1 the relatives of the first person named
in the declarations,
4 anv other person while using your car
a newly acquired car or a temporary
substitute car, if its use is within ctil
scope of consent of you or your spouse
and
5
any other person or organization liable
for the use of a coveredlraner b\ one or
the above insureds
THERE IS NO COVERAGE WHEN A TRAILER
IS USED WITH A MOTOR VEHICLE THAT IS

NOT COVERED UNDER THE LIABILITY
COVERAGE OF THIS POLICY
Limits of Liability
the amount of bodily injury liability coverage is
Shown on the declarations page under 'Limits of
Liability - Coverage A - Bodily Injury Each
Person. Each Accident" Under 'Each Person is
the amount of co\erage for all damages due to
bodily injury to one person 'Bodily injury to
person includes all injury and damages to
§ne
triers resulting from this bodily injury, and all
emotional distress resulting from this bodily injury sustained b> other persons who do not sustain bodily injury Under Each Accident' is the
Total amount of coverage, subject to the amount
shown under "Each Person", tor all damages due
,to bodily injury to two or more persons in the
same accident
The amount of property damage liability co\er
age is shown on the declarations page under
"Limits of Liability - Coverage A -TPropem
Damage, Each Accident"
We will pay damages for which an insured u>
legally Jiaole up to these amounts
The limits ol" liability are not increased became
more than one person or organization rna> be an
insured
A motor \ehiele and attached trailer are one \c
hide Thcreiore the limits are not increased
When Co>erage A Does Not Apply
In addition to the limitations of coverage in Who
Is an Insured and Trailer Coverage
THERE IS NO COVERAGE
I WHILE ANY VEHICLE INSURED
L NDER THIS SECTION IS
a RENTED OR LEASED TO OTHERS
b USED TO CARRY PERSONS FOR
A CHARGE This docs not applv to
the use on a ahare expense basi& of
{\\ apri\atepassenger car or
(2) a utility vehicle, if all passengers are ndma in that area or
The vehicle designed bv the
manufacturer of the vehicle *i r
carrying passengers
BEING REPAIRED SERMCED
OR USED BY AN^r PERSON
EMPLOYED OR ENGAGED IN
ANY WAY IN A CAR BUSINESS
i 1> If no other valid ana wolle-tiok
insurance is aoDhcable in

Z*

b.

ANY PERSON WHO IS AN EM*
PLOYEE OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA OR ANY
OF ITS AGENCIES, IF THE
PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT APPLY.
4. FOR ANY DAMAGES TO PROP^
ERTY OWNED BY. RENTED TO. IN
THE CHARGE OF OR TRANSPORTED BY AN INSURED. But coverage applies to a rented:
a. residence; or
b. private garage
damaged by a car we insure.5. FOR ANY OBLIGATION OF AN /A'SURED. OR HIS OR HER INSURER.
UNDER ANY TYPE OF WORKERSCOMPENSATION OR DISABILITY
OR SIMILAR LAW.
6. FOR LIABILITY ASSUMED BY THE
INSURED UNDER ANY CONTRACT
OR AGREEMENT
If There Is Other Liability Coverage
1. Policies Issued by Us to You, Your Spouse,
or Any Relative
If two or more vehicle liability policies issued by us to you, your spouser or any relative apply to the same accident, the total
limits of liability under all such policies
shall not exceed that of the policy with the
highest limit of liability.
2. Other Liability Coverage Available From
Other Sources
Subject to item I, if other vehicle liability
coverage applies, we are liable only for our
share of the damages. Our share is the percent that The limit of liability of this policy
bears to the total of all vehicle liability coverage applicable to the accident.
3. Temporary Substitute Car, Non-Owned
Car, Trailer
Subject to items 1 and 2, if a temporary substitute car, a non-owned car or a trailer designed for use with a. private passenger car
or utility vehicle:
a. has other vehicle liability coverage on!
it; or
r
b. is sel ^insured under any motor vehicle
financial responsibility law, a motor
carrier law or any similar law,
then this coverage is excess over such insurance or self-insurance. However, subject to

provision applies 10 a motor
vehicle business, its officers,
asents and employees, but only
to the extent the limits of liability of this policy exceed the
minimum limits of liability required by section 31A-22-304
of the tkah Insurance Laws.
The minimum required limits
are:
(a) 525,000 for each person
and 550,000 for each accident, if the limit of liability for this coverage is
shown as a split limn on
the declarationspage; or
(b)' $65,000 for each accident.
if the limit of liability for
this coverage is shown as
a single limit on the declarations page.
(2) This provision in its entirety
does not appty to:
(a) you or your spouse;
(b) any relative•;
(c) any resident of your
household; or
(d) any a°enl-, employee or partner oi you, your spousey any
relative or such resident.
This coverage is excess for (c)
and (d) above.
FOR ANY BODILY INJURY TO:
a. A FELLOW EMPLOYEE WHILE
ON THE JOB AND ARISING
FROM THE MAINTENANCE OR
USE OF A VEHICLE BY ANOTHER EMPLOYEE IN THE
EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS. You
and your spouse arc covered for
such injury to a fellow employee.
b. ANY EMPLOYEE OF AN INSURED ARISING OUT OF HIS
OR HER EMPLOYMENT This
does not apply to a household employee who is neither covered nor.
required to be covered under any
workers' compensation insurance.
FOR;
THE UNITED
STATES OF
AMERICA OR ANY OF ITS
AGENCIES; OR
8
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items I and 2 above, this policy shall provide primary coverage if:
a. the vehicle is owned by a car business:
b. an insured js operating the vehicle: and'
c. the insured is neither a person engaged
in such car business nor that person's
employee or agent.
4. Newly Acquired Car
THIS COVERAGE DOES NOT APPLY IF
THERE IS OTHER VEHICLE LIABILITY
COVERAGE ON A NEWLY ACQUIRED
CAR.
Motor Vehicle Compulsory Insurance Law
or Financial Responsibility Law
1. Out-of-State Coverage
If an insured under the liability coverage is
in another state or Canada and, as a nonresident, becomes subject to its motor vehicle
compulsory insurance, financial responsibility or similar law:
a. the policy will be interpreted to give the
coverage required by the law; and
b. the coverage so given replaces any coverage in this policy to the extent required by the law for the insureds

f'

operation, maintenance or use of a car
insured under this policy.
Any coverage so extended shall be reduced
to the extent other coverage applies to the
accident. In no event shall a person collect
more than once.
Financial Responsibility Law
When certified under any law as proof of
future financial responsibility, and while required during the policy period, this policy
snail comply"with such law to the extent required. Tne insured agrees to repay us for
anv payment we would not have had to
make under the terms of this policy except
for this agreement.
Duplicate Coverage and Arbitration
If an insured is or would be held legally liable
for tho damages resulting from bodily' injury
sustained by any person to whom benefits required under no-fault coverage have been paid
by another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, we will reimburse the
other insurer for the payment; but not in excess
of the amount recoverable.
The issue of liability and the amount will be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between
the insurers.
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COVERAGES
This endorsement is a part Qf your policy Excep£for the changes it makes, all other terms of the
policy remain the same and apply to this endorsgfnent It is effective at the same time as your
policy unless a different effective date is specified by us in writing
In consideration of the premium charged, it is agreed that your policy is changed as follows
1. DEFINED WORDS
Non-Owned Car — The provision which
reads
'JNon-owned car does not include a
rented car while it is used in connec
tion with the insured's employment or
business "

b

The limit of our liability for loss to
property or any part of it is the
lower of

is deleted
2.

SECTION IV — PHYSICAL DAMAGE
COVERAGES
a

The following is added to the definition of Loss
Loss does not include any reduc
tion in the value of any vehicle or
detachable living quarters after it
has been repaired, as compared to
Us value before it was damaeed

The first paragraph of Limit of Liability — Comprehensive and Collision Coverages is changed to read

c

1

the actual cash value or

2

the cost of repair or re
placement The cost of re
pair or replacement does not
include any reduction in the
value of the property after it
has been repaired, as compared to its value before it
was damaged

Item 2c of Trailer Coverage is deleted

Chief Executive Officer
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6944.1 A M E N D A T 0 1 « f f i N D O R S E M E N T
This endorsement is a part of your policy. Exce
policy remain* the same and apply to this endo
policy unless a different effective date is specifi

the changes it makes, all other terms of tb
ft It is effective at the same time as you
ns in writing
>
In consideration of the premium charged, it is agrfgl that jwwr policy is changed as follows;
DEFINED WORDS
a.

The following definition is added:
Fungi - means any type or form
of fiingus or fungi and includes:

b.

b y anyone we name, as often as w
reasonably ask, and sign copies of th'
answers.
SECTION I — LIABILITY — COVER
AGE A
Under the paragraph that reads "In addi
tion to the limits of liability, we will pa;
for an insured any costs listed below re
suiting from such accident":

1.

mold;

2.

mildew; and

3.

any of the following that
are produced or released
by fungi:

a.

item 3c is deleted.

a.

b,

item 4 is changed to read:

Non-Owned
reads:

mycotoxins;

b.

spores;

c.

scents; or

d.

byproducts.

Car - The provision which

Non-owned car does not include a
rented car while it is used in connection with the insured's employment or business.

A, Trie faWowVng costs and e^
penses if related to and in
curred after a civil lawsuit ha
been filed against an insura
for damages for which liabilir
coverage is provided by thi
policy:
a.

is deleted.

(1) an arbitration;

2. REPORTING A CLAIM — INSURED'S
DUTIES
Item 2, Notice to Us of Claim or Suit, is
changed to read:
Notice to Us of Claim or Suit
If a claim or suit is made against an insured, that insured musr at once send
us every demand, notice or claim made
and every summons or jegal process
received. That insured also shall answer questions under oath when asked
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loss of-wages or salary, bu
not other income, up tt
$100 for each day an insured attends at our request:
(2) a mediation: or
(3) a trial of a civil suit.

b.

reasonable expenses incurred by an insured at
our request, other than loss
of wages, salary, or other
income.

The amount of any of the costs
or expenses listed above that
are incurred by an insured

6944.1

in the value of the property after it has been repaired, as compared to its
value before it was damaged.

must* be reported to us before
we will pay.
4.

SECTION IV — PHYSICAL DAMAGE
COVERAGES
a.

The following is added to the definition of Loss:
Loss does not include any reduction in the value of any vehicle or
detachable living quarters after it
has been repaired, as compared to
its value before it was damaged.

b.

The second paragraph of item 1 under
COMPREHENSIVE - COVERAGE
D is changed to read:
Breakage of glass or loss due to
hitting or being hit by a bird or an
animal is payable under this coverage,

c.

The following is added to C O L L I SION - COVERAGE G:
Loss caused by collision does not
include loss due to:
1. missiles or falling objects;
2. windstorm or haih

d.

3.
4.

earthquake, water or flood;
theft or larceny:

5.

malicious
mischief
vandalism: or

6.

riot or civil commotion.

or

e.

Item 2 of the provision titled Trailer
Coverage is changed to read:
2.

Non-Owned Trailer or Detachable Living Quarters
Any physical damage coverage in force on your car applies to a non-owned:
a.

b.

detachable living quarters
unit
used by the first perso n named
in the declarations, his or her
spouse or their relatives.
The most we will pay under
the comprehensive or collision
coverage for a loss to such
non-owned trailer or unit is
$2,500.
A non-owned trailer or detachable living quarters unit is one
that:
a.

(2) any other person residing in the same househ old as you, your spouse
or any relative: or

The limit of our liability for loss to
property or any part of it is the
lower of:
1. the actual cash value; or
the cost of repair or replacement. The cost of
repair or replacement does
not include any reduction
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is not owned by or registered in the name of:
(1) you, your spouse, any
relative;

The first paragraph of Limits of Liability - Comprehensive and Collision Coverages is changed to read:

2.

trailer, if it is designed for
use with a private passenger car, or

b.

(3) an employer of you.
your spouse or any
relative; and
has not been used or
rented by or in the possession of you, your spouse
or any relative during an>

f.

part of each of the last 21
or more consecutive days.
If you are insured by one
or more other car policies
issued by us, the 21 day
limit is increased by an
additional 21 days for each
such additional policy.
The following is added to When The
Physical Damage Coverages Do Not
Apply:
(I) THERE IS NO COVERAGE FOR
LOSS TO ANY VEHICLE DUE
TO FUNGI. THIS APPLIES REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR
NOT THE FUNGI RESULT
FROM A LOSS THAT IS PAYABLE UNDER ANY OF THE
PHYSICAL DAMAGE COVERAGES. WE WILL ALSO NOT
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PAY FOR ANY TESTING OR
REMEDIATION OF FUNGI, OR
ANY ADDITIONAL COSTS
REQUIRED TO REPAIR ANY
VEHICLE THAT ARE DUE TO
THE EXISTENCE OF FUNGL
(2) THERE IS NO COVERAGE FOR
LOSS TO ANY VEHICLE THAT
RESULTS FROM:
(a) NUCLEAR REACTION;
(b) RADIAHON OR RADIOACTIVE
CONTAMINATION FROM ANY
SOURCE; OR
(c) THE ACCIDENTAL OR INTENTIONAL DETONATION
OF, OR RELEASE OF RADIATION FROM, ANY NUCLEAR OR RADIOACTIVE
DEVICE.
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